Legal Case Summary

We'll hear argument next in case 121493 of Bromsky versus United States, Mr. Deeds. Mr. Chief Justice, may it please the Court. In 2009, Bruce Abramsky went to a gun store in his home in Virginia and purchased the firearm. When he did so, he filled out all the required federal paperwork providing his own name and identifying information and passing a background check. He then traveled to his uncle's home in Pennsylvania and delivered the firearm to a licensed gun dealer there. That gun dealer required Mr. Abramsky's uncle to fill out the exact same federal paperwork and pass his own background check before taking possession of the firearm. But despite doing precisely what Congress established as the process to buy a firearm intending to sell or give it to a lawful gun owner in another state, the government charged Mr. Abramsky with falsely stating that he was the actual buyer of the firearm when he acquired it. In that term, what will happen if two people walk into the gun store, one person hands the money to the other and says, buy me that gun? Is that not actionable? You are on the certain point of your theory? You are on the circumstances where there are two lawful gun owners that is permissible. I think a good way to illustrate that is to consider the government's concession that in that hypothetical, if two people walked into the gun store and the person looked and said, I would like that gun and points to the counter. And then the person stands. What is truthful about saying, please finish what you were saying. I didn't understand what your point was. Yes, Your Honor. And in that circumstance, if the person standing at the counter then says, I would like to buy that firearm that the person indicated, I am going to give it to that person. Then even the government concedes that in that circumstance everything about that sale is perfectly lawful and the buyer can take the gun, hand it to that person standing next to him who would leave the gun store with the gun dealer and the government having absolutely no idea who that person is or where the gun is going. I am sorry, so you are saying that in that case the gun dealer runs the background check on the person who hands the gun dealer the credit card as opposed to the person who will be the actual recipient of the gun. Is that what you are saying the statute requires? That is correct, Your Honor. I think the government concedes that as well in the gift circumstance at least. And there is certainly nothing in the gun control act that suggests that Congress was distinguishing between those two circumstances. Well, in the gift situation, but Congress requires certain information from the buyer, whatever that means, right? The dealer has to record the name of the buyer, right? Yes, sir. And the address of the buyer and do an instant check on the buyer? Yes, sir. Now, why would this Congress have wanted those things with respect to the person who is just the straw purchaser, not the person who is actually going to acquire the weapon? The reason you are on this is that this legislation, the way Congress designed it, is not focused on sort of the end point. It is not concerned about where a gun is actually going, who is ultimately going to receive it. What Congress was concerned about was the starting point, because as part of the key political compromise of the gun control act, there were two competing interests that needed to be accommodate

. Why would they be concerned about the starting point? Let's say there is a man, Mr. Straw, and he holds himself out as a gun buyer. He puts a website, he creates a website, he has something in the yellow pages under Straw Man, and he says, you want to acquire a gun and you don't want the dealer to record your name and you don't want to have an instant check on you, you come to me. And so these people come to him, and whenever they do, he goes to Joe's gun shop. And with the other person, he says, I want to buy a gun, but this fellow with me is going to do all the talking. So the guy who is with him talks with Joe about different types of guns, costs, and everything, and after that's done, the person who is done all the talking, says, now my friend, Mr. Straw, is going to buy this gun, he gives Mr. Straw the money, Mr. Straw buys the gun, and the dealer writes down Mr. Straw's name for the 15th time that month is addressed as another instant check on it. What sense does that make? Here, I think, and to your first point about why, why starting points, the reason is because all that Congress wanted is to provide law enforcement with a way to trace the firearm. And if you have truthful, accurate information about the first initial purchaser, the person who walks out of a gun store with a gun in their hand, then law enforcement has that starting point if they need to trace the firearm. I suppose that your answer to what sense it makes is that was the compromise, that there was strong opposition to any gun control law. And the condition was you get the buyer, and you don't make the buyer promise not to give it to somebody else. He could immediately give it to somebody who's unqualified to own the gun, couldn't he? And would that be a violation? You know, that would violate other laws because Congress in the Fire Owners Protection Act clarified or amended the provision to provide that a private citizen who transfers a firearm to someone who no or have reasonable cause to believe is prohibited. That's a crime. What about somebody, somebody who is qualified to own a firearm? Can I take a firearm that I own and say, you know, it's yours? Yes, Your Honor. And I think the government has conceded that. If it's someone in your own state, there's a- Don't have to register it. I don't have to go through a firearm deal or write. It's my gun, and I can give it to somebody else who's qualified. That's correct, Your Honor. And in cases like Mr. Abramsley's case where his uncle lived in another state, Congress provided a path for those people as well, and that is you have to deliver the firearm to another dealer in that state before finishing the transfer. You're never going to know who the end user is. Once the gun is sold, whether you take the, you know, the straw buyer's name or the- or the other person's name or both. You don't know where the gun's going to end up, do you? Yes, Your Honor

. That's because that was the key compromise of the life. What matters in a statute? I mean, I do believe that. And here the relevant language seems to me that what it's material to the government says is the statute about selling or delivering. Now, did this person, was he the buyer, your client? Was he somebody that they sold or delivered it to? Well, he's a straw. A straw purchaser is someone who doesn't purchase. The person who purchases is the person who uses the straw. Now, you can't say that about a giver, a benefactor, is the, who is the beneficiary of the benefactor is not the purchaser. But the straw purchaser is not the purchaser. And it comes from straw bail, where someone else put up the bail. And it was called straw because the people who made a career of that used to wear straw in their shoes. Interesting. But in terms of, in terms of this case, the straw- He made that. No, I didn't. No, I thought he came from a wizard of Oz, but it doesn't. The fact is that is where it comes from. I think in every legal context, it means someone who is not the real. So who is the real? In this case, it is the person for whom the straw purchased. So we fit that within the language. We can't fit the beneficiary of a gift within the language. And that's the reason for the distinction. And so why not do it that way? With respect to your honor, I think that the principle you described of straw man or straw purchases in the context, historical context you described it. I don't believe it is a criminal context. And we've not been able to find any case in which the criminal law has ever recognized that sort of civil agency law principle that when there is a principle, agent relationship this fiduciary duty, that because the principle controls the agent or the straw man, that everything that the agent does is really an act of the principle. And Congress, there were historically criminal common law principles of agency. And Congress codified those principles in Title 18, United States Code Section 2. Those are things like aiding and abetting of principles and accessories. But that's not the principle in which the government relies on today

. The government- You still have not explained what purpose is served by obtaining the name of the straw purchaser and doing an instant check on the straw purchaser. You said that it allows the tracing of the weapon, but that's not going to be true. In the case of a straw purchaser because the person who the straw purchaser isn't necessarily and probably in the vast majority of cases isn't going to get the name or any information about the actual recipient. That's the whole purpose of having a straw purchaser. So then what purpose is served by this? It's just meaningless. What's the spectrum on our disagreeing? And the reason is again that the intent of Congress and the gun control act was not trace or track where firearms were going. And so in every case, because private sales have no record keeping or background check requirements, in every case where there's a trace of a firearm, the government has to go all the way back to the beginning. They go to the manufacturer with the serial number and follow the gun through the screen of commerce until they find that gun dealer where the gun was first sold. And then they find the gun dealer and the gun dealer said, I sold it to Mr. Straw. And then they go to Mr. Straw. Mr. Straw said, my client took it. Okay, who is your client? I have no idea. He came into my store. He contacted me. I didn't ask his name. He didn't give me his name. And that's the end of it. So no purpose is served by putting down the name, the address, doing the check on the straw purchaser. Your Honor, again, Congress understood that that's how the statute worked because, for example, what you're saying is they did a meaningless thing. That was the compromise. They would do something that's utterly meaningless. No, Your Honor. And the reason is, consider, for example, a circumstance where, instead of buying firemen with the intent to resell it, five minutes after the purchase, walking out of the gun store, a stranger approaches you and says, that's a nice looking gun. I'd like to buy it from you

. It's perfectly legal under the gun control act to sell the gun to that stranger who then believe, and again, in the tracing process, the government's trace will stop with that first purchaser. And Congress understood that that's how the process would work. And that was part of the compromise. What Congress wanted was accurate information about the initial person who acquires the firearms, so at least they can try to do that trace. And Congress understood that in many cases- Kagan- In some cases, they can't track it all the way. In this case, unlike the hypothetical that Justice Alita gave you, if they went to the straw purchaser, he would say, oh, I actually bought it for my uncle, and he'd give the uncle's name. And then the uncle would say, you know, where else the firearm went from him. Yes, Your Honor. In fact, in this case, the government received all the record keeping and background check information that they could possibly have received. They got full Federal paperwork from both Mr. Abransky and his uncle and ran a background check on both. Your position is that this was not a material, a mistake, man. Is that correct? Yes, Your Honor. Why isn't it material in light of the fact that it was a question that was on the government form that was promulgated by- that was directed by regulations? The reason you're on right, I think this is a critical concession by the government. It's on pages 35 and 36 of their brief. The government acknowledges that the statements on the form are just an interpretive rule. And not even sort of ordinary interpretive rule that this Court may encounter with agency interpretations where they're looking at the statute, and although they have not been delegated with authority to rule make, they are interpreting the text of the statute. Here the government acknowledges that the statement is an interpretation of the case law about the straw purchaser doctrine. And the problem with that is that there's a split in the circuits about what that case precedent should be. And the government suggesting that this Court should somehow defer to the statement on the form that it has the power of law that people should acknowledge it. But of course, when you have a case law question like this where there's a split, this Court is the authority that decides what the law should be, and it's not required to defer at all to the statements on the form. And your question. And your question. Mr. Deeds, can we go back to the question that Justice Alito raised. The primary object of this statute is to keep guns out of the hands of felons, of people with mental illness, and so forth. Now, it's absolutely true, as you have said, that Congress didn't do everything it could have to achieve that result

. Right? That there are many kinds of resales that are allowable, that there are gifts that are allowable. It's one thing to say that. It's another thing to say that at the initial point of sale, which is where the entire system is set up, right, with the gun dealer doing the automatic checks, that at that initial point of sale, which is the centerpiece of this statute, that we will essentially disregard fronts, that we, you know, that we don't care. That the person standing at the counter is a front. I mean, that goes far beyond the other kinds of resale possibilities that you're talking about. And I guess what I want to know is why you think a Congress that was geared towards this object of keeping guns out of the hands of dangerous people and set up a mechanism that had the gun seller be the kind of enforcer at the point of sale would have thought, that, oh, it's fine if a front, if a straw walks in the door. The reason they're honored is because Congress understood that private sales, that there was an importance to private sales between citizens. And in a straw purchase like this, or someone who's purchasing a gun intending to resell it to someone else, that is precisely what's happening. That second sale is a private transaction between two private citizens. And Congress did not want any regulation of those types of sales. And that was part of the political compromise in the law. And so, yes or I acknowledge that you would certainly describe this as a not a comprehensive regime. There are holes in the legislation. But remember, too, that Congress was not operating in a vacuum. It understood that although there may not be a national consensus about some of these issues, and therefore the regime that Congress chose may have the holes in it, that the states could fill those holes if there was a statewide consensus on that issue. And many states have done that. Some states have a life, for example, what is really a complete gun registration system. And others like West Virginia believe that there should be virtually no regulation of these sorts of private sales at all. And so I think the system is working precisely as Congress intended. And if there are problems, Congress will come back and fix it. And we've seen, for example, in the Firearms Owners Protection Act and in the Brady Act, that this is an area where Congress is continuing to observe what's going on in the nation and making changes to the law. Is that necessary? In the situation that Justice Alito hypothesized of the person who's doing this several times a month and as the ad in the yellow pages, is that person subject to regulation as a dealer? Yes, Your Honor. I wanted to make that point. And that is that, of course, if you engage in the business of purchasing firearms to sell to others, then you will, at some point, be subject to the licensing requirements that Congress created. So, again, this is not a system that has some obvious loophole where people can begin to engage in their own sort of sale of guns to others. This is a situation where Congress wanted to leave open the option for private citizens like Mr. Abramsky to purchase guns for other lawful gun owners like family members, neighbors and friends

. But this family member, the uncle, reside in Pennsylvania. He could not have purchased that gun in Virginia, isn't that right? This is an unresident. With respect to Your Honor, I disagree. It's true that he could not have walked into the gun store and left the gun store in Virginia with the gun, but he could have purchased it there. Congress created a means in the statute for the gun to then be shipped to a gun dealer in Pennsylvania, and he would have to pick up the gun and, again, fill out the federal forms and undergo a background check at that gun dealer in his home in Pennsylvania. So wouldn't he have to comply with the 552C, which says how somebody who doesn't show up in person can purchase a gun, and none of those requirements were satisfied here. So it seems to me that what you're asking is just an end run around what Congress said. If you're at a state and want to buy it, this is how you have to do it. With respect to Your Honor, I don't think that's what Congress meant in Section 922C, which is the provision that deals with absent buyers. And the concern there was Congress wanted to leave open two paths for gun buyers. One is to physically be present at the gun store and fill out the papers yourself where the gun dealer, as you are writing your name and age and your height and eye color on the forms, there's a person there looking at you. And there was also an option that Congress provided for people to purchase a gun, for example, by telephone or mail or over the Internet, without ever actually being present, with no person being present in the gun store. And it was in that circumstance that Congress said we think we need a little bit more record keeping in those cases. So that's why they required the affidavit, for example, in the waiting period to provide extra time for local law enforcement in the background check. But that's not the situation here. Mr. Abramsky was physically present at the gun store. And so that provision of the statute is not even implicated here. Another point, Your Honor, is that the plain text interpretation of the statute is one that the agency, ATF, had adopted initially in 1979 the agency sent a circular to gun dealers that took the precise position that the petitioner is taking here, which is that a purchase of a gun for another lawful gun owner is permissible. And in doing so, the agency said that that was an interpretation of the text of the gun for a lack. What is the government's, I guess I should ask the government, but does the government contend that there are two buyers now, both, or is the real buyer, the person who sends in the straw man, so that it's only his information that you have to give, are there two buyers? Your Honor, I don't know the government's position, but our position is that there is one buyer, and that's the person who's actually paying for the gun, filling out the forms, undergoing a background check, and leaving the gun, leaving the gun store with the gun in their hand. And Congress didn't use terms like true buyer or true purchaser actual buyer because they were not concerned about the ultimate recipients of firearms or what happens to a gun after it leaves the gun store. The focus of the gun control act is on that initial purchase and making sure that that purchase is not the case. What position are you taking here? Are you arguing that it doesn't matter whether it's a straw purchaser or not, a buyer is a buyer is a buyer. It's the person who puts the money down on the counter. Or are you arguing as a backup or as your main point that don't understand that if it's a lawful buyer using a straw man, that that's not actionable. Yes, Your Honor

. We are arguing, yes, that the person who pays for the gun, the person that's there in the gun store, pays for the buyer is the buyer. That is the, or the, in fact, the term buyer isn't even using the gun for a long time. Even if they are intentous to sell it to a prohibited person. That's correct, Your Honor. And in those circumstances, again, I think this is an important point, is that Congress provided a number of means to prosecute illegal straw purchasers. And all of those provisions are still available to the government, even if this court was to disapprove the straw purchaser doctrine in all its applications. But if we disagreed with you on the first point about the straw purchaser, would you lose on the ground that Mr. Abramsky's uncle could not have lawfully purchased the gun at that store because he wasn't a resident of the state? No, Your Honor. And two points there. First, as I mentioned, it would have been possible for Mr. Abramsky's uncle to purchase the gun in Virginia. He could have gone to that gun store and say, this is the gun I want and paid the money. He would have had to go back, the gun would have had to have been shipped to Pennsylvania, and he would have had to take possession of it in Pennsylvania after filling out the additional paperwork. He couldn't have taken possession of it in Pennsylvania. In Virginia. That's correct, Your Honor. But again, I don't think that that changes the materiality analysis because, again, the question is not whether Mr. Abramsky's uncle could have picked up or bought the gun of Virginia. The question is, if Mr. Abramsky had told the gun dealer the truth that, yes, I plan to buy this gun, but I'm going to take it up to Pennsylvania and give it to my uncle after I delivered to a gun dealer there. The way that the Congress wrote the Gun Control Act, the gun dealer still could have sold the gun to Mr. Abramsky. That would have been a lawful sale if the gun had been delivered to him on the spot. To Mr. Abramsky's uncle? Yes. Mr. Abramsky's out of the picture

. The uncle goes in, buys the gun, puts down a Pennsylvania dress, the dealer gives him the gun, walks out of the store. That would that be a lawful sale? No, Your Honor. No, Mr. Abramsky's uncle could not take, could not have bought the gun in another state, taken possession of it. But again, the materiality question, the way this Court has described that standard in Kungus is whether, if Mr. Abramsky had provided the truthful information, if that would have been capable of influencing the outcome in that case. Well, I mean, it would have been good. In describing what happened here, you said that Abramsky went in and then went to Pennsylvania and gave the gun to his uncle. That's not quite correct. He transferred it to him for consideration. I had thought, and this was, goes back to Justice Scalia, Quistis, a question about, if there's one buyer here or two, I had thought that it might be possible that you can to construct a case where Abramsky tells his uncle, I'm going to buy the gun. And then I'm going to sell it to you, and I'm going to sell it to you in Pennsylvania at a gun dealer's store so we can fill out the necessary forms. Would the government then have objected to what happened here? I mean, we can ask the government, Justice Scalia, indicate, but as you understand their case. Yes, Your Honor. I think the reason is that the government's position is that you cannot buy a gun intending to sell it to another lawful gun owner. That is the government's position. But just one point of clarification is, to the extent it's relevant, Mr. Abramsky did not receive consideration for the purchase of the firearm. The record indicates that his uncle sent him a check to cover the cost of the gun. This was, in all respects, someone doing a favor for a family member. Could you address the other point here, which is the one I have more trouble with, to tell you the truth? Count two. Yes, Your Honor. And that count, the language that Congress goes was that one cannot make a false statement about information required by this chapter to be kept. Right. This chapter meaning chapter 44, the gun control act itself. And the gun control act contains actually references as a provision, and that's 922b5, where Congress says this is the information that uses that term required to be kept. And it lists three things, the name, age, and place of residence of the person acquiring the gun from the gun dealer

. And then ATF has promulgated regulations that have added an additional layer of information that must be included on the forms. But the government's position, of course, this question 11, who is the actual buyer? That's not one of the things that's included either in the text of the gun control act or in ATF's regulations. And what the government has said in this case is, well, that's right, but we view the authorization of Congress to create the form, sort of a blanket authorization to put, ask whatever we want in the form and make anything that we ask in the form information required to be kept. Can you lie in answering questions that the government has no technical right to answer? I mean, let's assume I agree with you that in fact, this information was, the government was not authorized to obtain this information, and therefore it was not required to be kept. But nonetheless, they asked it, and your client didn't just say I won't answer, he lied. Now, can you lie so long as the question is improper? No, no, I think the key in this case is that Congress included a materiality element for almost every false statement that would occur in this context, and they enacted a separate statute that did not have that materiality requirement, and the reason was Congress wanted to be sure that that provision that did not have the materiality requirement only applied to the false statements that Congress thought were the very important ones, and therefore they delineated what those that category of statements was, and the question on the form is not one of them, and that, your honor is the reason why Mr. Abramsky cannot be convicted under that provision. I'd like to reserve the remainder of my time for a vote. Thank you, counsel. Mr. Palmore? Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court. I think it would be helpful if I could, at the outset, frame what I see as the issues here, because as some of the questioning revealed, petitioner is making two separate arguments. His first argument is, in a sense, that there is no such thing as a scoffer to serve doctrine. I take that actually as a false-city argument. He's saying, when I answered that I was the purchaser, that was a true statement because I'm the only purchaser who counted purposes of the statute, because I was the one standing there and I was the one filling out the form. His second argument is an alternative argument, as I understand it, and he says, even assuming I'm wrong about the first argument and that this statement was false, that that falsehood was not material because my uncle was legally eligible to possess a firearm. So I'd like to take those two arguments in order. As for the first, are there two buyers in your view? I think in a sense, you could understand there to be two buyers. The buyer who counts under the statute, though, is the actual buyer. Well, what does the person who's buying for somebody else, he has to provide both names or just the name of the real buyer? Justice Scalia, if you hypothesize a situation in which two roommates wanted to buy a firearm together, firearms are expensive. They can't each afford their own, but they want one for personal protection. And if one went into the store and said, I'm buying this firearm for myself and my roommate who's not here, that transaction could not lawfully go forward because the two members were physically present and they didn't go through all the statutory costs. And both of them had to take possession, right? Right. In that sense, right, right, because the whole, that's not the case here. The person who paid took possession was authorized to take possession. In the straw purchaser cases, the person takes possession in an ephemeral sense

. They are merely the conduit. The whole purpose and effect of the transaction is to deliver that firearm to someone else. So they're in this, I'm sorry. So there are two buyers. And both of them have to be on the form. If there are two buyers, two people have been made on the line. They would each need to go forward. One's that I can understand you're saying the real buyer is the person who put up the money. Well, of course, the form tells you who the real buyer is. And it's a substance-overformed inquiry. And we think this is supported by not only the text, but also the structure and purpose of the gun control act. Where in the act does is the basis for the requirement on the form. The form says, you know, if you're not the actual purge, you're buying for somebody else, but where is that in the statute? That is a, that is a, ATF's reasonable interpretation of the statute. And I was just going to get to that. It's current one. It used to have a different one. That's current one, and it's been consistent for the last 20 years, Justice Scalia. So the statute, we think both the text and the structure and purpose support this view. The text is most readily identifiable in Section 922-A6 itself, which this Court in Huddleston, which is the count one of the conviction. It's the false statement provision at issue here. And this is quoted up pages one through two of the government's brief. So the provision says it shall be unlawful for any person in connection with the acquisition or attempted acquisition of a firearm and it goes on. And it talks, at the end, it talks about the lawfulness of the sale or other disposition of such firearm. This case is in the first one which the Court has had occasion to interpret those terms. In Huddleston, the Court looked at those terms in particular acquisition and disposition, and it said several things about those terms that are relevant here. It said, those terms are meant to have a practical common sense meaning in terms of who will become into possession and control of a firearm as the result of a transaction with a federally regulated dealer. And they don't turn on formal notions of legal title and that with respect to disposition in particular, that it was that Congress meant to give broad effect to this term. And so we think that the same kind of practical, common sense inquiry is applicable here. When looking at the transaction, the question is, what is the ultimate purpose and effect of this transaction? Is it to have someone else acquire the firearm? That's not the point. The point is that it isn't the language. His point is that I think that the statute, it has to be material to the lawfulness of the sale. Now, we look to see what section is it material to. And you say, in your brief, it's material to the section that says you have two of them, but they come to the same thing. Selling or delivering any firearm to any person. All right? Now, he says, did they sell or deliver this firearm to what you call the real purchaser? There's no. They sold or delivered it to the straw. And that's the end of the matter. And at least the statute is open to this interpretation and it's a criminal statute. And B5, besides the ATF for a long time, is interpreted that way. So what we should do is interpret it strictly. Now, that's, I think, the basis of their argument if I understand it. And so you have to get those words, sale and deliver and explain how in the criminal statute they apply to what you're calling the real purchaser. Right, Justice Breyer. The statute uses a number of different terms to denote what we take to be a substance over form, inquiry into the actual possession and control of the firearm. So in 922-A6, as we were just talking about, it talks about acquisition, sale or disposition. If you also vote to a serial, the need for it to be material to the lawfulness of the sale. You seem to concede that in the brief. It needs to be a serial. Yes, serial. And there are two sections. And both come to the same thing, which is what I said. So this is where we get back to the fact that there are two different issues in this case. If I convince you that there was a false statement here because Petitioner's uncle was the actual purchaser. Oh, if he was, if he then, if he is the actual purchaser, then he falls within the term of a person to whom the firearm was sold or delivered

. And so we think that the same kind of practical, common sense inquiry is applicable here. When looking at the transaction, the question is, what is the ultimate purpose and effect of this transaction? Is it to have someone else acquire the firearm? That's not the point. The point is that it isn't the language. His point is that I think that the statute, it has to be material to the lawfulness of the sale. Now, we look to see what section is it material to. And you say, in your brief, it's material to the section that says you have two of them, but they come to the same thing. Selling or delivering any firearm to any person. All right? Now, he says, did they sell or deliver this firearm to what you call the real purchaser? There's no. They sold or delivered it to the straw. And that's the end of the matter. And at least the statute is open to this interpretation and it's a criminal statute. And B5, besides the ATF for a long time, is interpreted that way. So what we should do is interpret it strictly. Now, that's, I think, the basis of their argument if I understand it. And so you have to get those words, sale and deliver and explain how in the criminal statute they apply to what you're calling the real purchaser. Right, Justice Breyer. The statute uses a number of different terms to denote what we take to be a substance over form, inquiry into the actual possession and control of the firearm. So in 922-A6, as we were just talking about, it talks about acquisition, sale or disposition. If you also vote to a serial, the need for it to be material to the lawfulness of the sale. You seem to concede that in the brief. It needs to be a serial. Yes, serial. And there are two sections. And both come to the same thing, which is what I said. So this is where we get back to the fact that there are two different issues in this case. If I convince you that there was a false statement here because Petitioner's uncle was the actual purchaser. Oh, if he was, if he then, if he is the actual purchaser, then he falls within the term of a person to whom the firearm was sold or delivered. That's your argument. And his name wasn't put on the form. Oh, there's no question about that. Right. So if I could just finish one other thought on this first issue of falsity, and as Justice Sotomayor and Justice Delitos hypotheticals demonstrated, under Petitioner's view of the statute, I could approach someone in the parking lot outside of a license dealer. I could say, would you like to make a quick buck? Please come in with me. I could point to the firearm I want. I could hand him the money. I could look over his shoulder as he fills out form 4473 in his own name. I could watch the dealer run that person's name and identity through the criminal background check. And as we leave the shop together, he could hand me that firearm. Why is that any, why is that any more horrible than the notion that as soon as I buy it, I walk out of the store. And I meet this guy in the parking lot. He says, hey, that's a nifty look and gun there. How much did you pay for it? I paid $600. I'll give you $700. Oh, it's yours. Right? I can hand it to him, can I? You could, Justice Sotomayor. So the notion that the gun would somehow get into the hands of somebody who, you know, who wasn't registered or who couldn't buy it himself, I mean, that's going to happen anyway. What you assert does not stop that problem. Justice Scalia, Congress was obviously balancing a number of interests when it enacted these provisions. If you read the text of the statute in the legislative history, it's clear that Congress thought the principal problem was effectively unregulated sales of firearms from dealers. That's the problem it wanted to focus on. And you're right that it didn't want to go further and intrude on private transactions among unlicensed individuals. It drew a line, but it drew a line at a point where it thought the actual problem was. And that line was up to and including the point of sale. But Mr

. That's your argument. And his name wasn't put on the form. Oh, there's no question about that. Right. So if I could just finish one other thought on this first issue of falsity, and as Justice Sotomayor and Justice Delitos hypotheticals demonstrated, under Petitioner's view of the statute, I could approach someone in the parking lot outside of a license dealer. I could say, would you like to make a quick buck? Please come in with me. I could point to the firearm I want. I could hand him the money. I could look over his shoulder as he fills out form 4473 in his own name. I could watch the dealer run that person's name and identity through the criminal background check. And as we leave the shop together, he could hand me that firearm. Why is that any, why is that any more horrible than the notion that as soon as I buy it, I walk out of the store. And I meet this guy in the parking lot. He says, hey, that's a nifty look and gun there. How much did you pay for it? I paid $600. I'll give you $700. Oh, it's yours. Right? I can hand it to him, can I? You could, Justice Sotomayor. So the notion that the gun would somehow get into the hands of somebody who, you know, who wasn't registered or who couldn't buy it himself, I mean, that's going to happen anyway. What you assert does not stop that problem. Justice Scalia, Congress was obviously balancing a number of interests when it enacted these provisions. If you read the text of the statute in the legislative history, it's clear that Congress thought the principal problem was effectively unregulated sales of firearms from dealers. That's the problem it wanted to focus on. And you're right that it didn't want to go further and intrude on private transactions among unlicensed individuals. It drew a line, but it drew a line at a point where it thought the actual problem was. And that line was up to and including the point of sale. But Mr. Palmore, when the agency changes view in 1994, there was no change in the statutory text, was there? There was not Justice Ginsburg. And at that time, the interpretation was that you committed the offense if you sold if the person, the true buyer, was an unlawful person to whom firearms could not be sold. But if the ultimate possessor was a lawful possessor, then there was no liability. So the statute has to be open at least to either interpretation, no change in the words, the agency read it one way and then later changes blind and read it the other way. That's right, Justice Ginsburg. And I think that takes us to the second issue here, which is the materiality issue. And I think what happened was that the agency's earlier view of the statute was essentially overtaken by the case law in several respects. And the agency therefore updated its view and has consistently applied that view for the last 20 years. But still, what I thought was a very good argument on your side is exactly what I said, the narrow interpretation, would also apply to a straw man who buys a gun for Al Capone. And so this part of the statute would be virtually worthless. Their response to that is don't worry about that. There are plenty of other provisions that will take care of that. Are there? And if it's so obvious about the Al Capone, why did the ATF decide it their way for 20 years? I mean, how did they get into that? Justice Breyer, I think that the other provisions that Petitioners referring to is 922D, which makes it unlawful for anyone licensed or unlicensed to transfer a firearm to someone in a prohibited category, if the transfer or nose or has reasonable cause to believe that the person is in a prohibited category. And that is a completely inadequate substitute for what the kind of regulation we're talking here for a variety of reasons. One is the mens rea requirement that I just mentioned. So on my hypothetical involving the parking lot, the person, the straw purchaser doesn't even know my name, much less anything about my background, whether I was dishonorably discharged from the military, whether I have mental health issues, doesn't know anything about me. He has no reason to ask. I certainly have no motivation to tell him. And yet that transaction can go forward and there's could be, it would be very difficult to prosecute that straw purchaser for a illegal transfer if it turned out that I was a felon. Second is the whole purpose of this structure of this statute, especially after it was amended in the early 90s, was to not, was to put in place and reinforce a dealer-based regulatory system in which the eligibility of firearm transfer for ease is determined based on a search through a database. We don't take even the transfer, transfer ease say so as to whether or not he's an eligible person. I think it's a lot of, it's very problematic to talk about the overriding purpose when you're dealing with a very sensitive compromise. There's, as far as I can tell, nothing in the language of the statute that talks about straw men or actual buyers or anything like that. You're right, Your Honor. Just as there's nothing in the mail or wire fraud statute that talks about Ponzi schemes, that a Ponzi scheme is simply a way away. Well, but there wasn't a strong lobby in Congress saying we're the group that supports Ponzi schemes. So maybe it makes more sense to have a broad construction of that provision

. Palmore, when the agency changes view in 1994, there was no change in the statutory text, was there? There was not Justice Ginsburg. And at that time, the interpretation was that you committed the offense if you sold if the person, the true buyer, was an unlawful person to whom firearms could not be sold. But if the ultimate possessor was a lawful possessor, then there was no liability. So the statute has to be open at least to either interpretation, no change in the words, the agency read it one way and then later changes blind and read it the other way. That's right, Justice Ginsburg. And I think that takes us to the second issue here, which is the materiality issue. And I think what happened was that the agency's earlier view of the statute was essentially overtaken by the case law in several respects. And the agency therefore updated its view and has consistently applied that view for the last 20 years. But still, what I thought was a very good argument on your side is exactly what I said, the narrow interpretation, would also apply to a straw man who buys a gun for Al Capone. And so this part of the statute would be virtually worthless. Their response to that is don't worry about that. There are plenty of other provisions that will take care of that. Are there? And if it's so obvious about the Al Capone, why did the ATF decide it their way for 20 years? I mean, how did they get into that? Justice Breyer, I think that the other provisions that Petitioners referring to is 922D, which makes it unlawful for anyone licensed or unlicensed to transfer a firearm to someone in a prohibited category, if the transfer or nose or has reasonable cause to believe that the person is in a prohibited category. And that is a completely inadequate substitute for what the kind of regulation we're talking here for a variety of reasons. One is the mens rea requirement that I just mentioned. So on my hypothetical involving the parking lot, the person, the straw purchaser doesn't even know my name, much less anything about my background, whether I was dishonorably discharged from the military, whether I have mental health issues, doesn't know anything about me. He has no reason to ask. I certainly have no motivation to tell him. And yet that transaction can go forward and there's could be, it would be very difficult to prosecute that straw purchaser for a illegal transfer if it turned out that I was a felon. Second is the whole purpose of this structure of this statute, especially after it was amended in the early 90s, was to not, was to put in place and reinforce a dealer-based regulatory system in which the eligibility of firearm transfer for ease is determined based on a search through a database. We don't take even the transfer, transfer ease say so as to whether or not he's an eligible person. I think it's a lot of, it's very problematic to talk about the overriding purpose when you're dealing with a very sensitive compromise. There's, as far as I can tell, nothing in the language of the statute that talks about straw men or actual buyers or anything like that. You're right, Your Honor. Just as there's nothing in the mail or wire fraud statute that talks about Ponzi schemes, that a Ponzi scheme is simply a way away. Well, but there wasn't a strong lobby in Congress saying we're the group that supports Ponzi schemes. So maybe it makes more sense to have a broad construction of that provision. This language is fought over tooth and nail by people on the, you know, gun control side and the gun ownership side. And to say you look at it and say, well, the purpose is this, even though there's no words in the statute that have anything to do with straw purchasers, I think it's very problematic. Well, Your Honor, I think we do have a textual argument which I referred to before, but there's also, it's not just a purpose argument, it's a contextual and structural argument, and it's the one that Justice Alito alluded to. So you agree that from Justice Alito's example, that person is regulated as a gun dealer, right? At a certain point, a person, if they're audiologous, with writing, if they're operating as a seller or firearms, they would have to register. Well, I meant my hypothetical. So he doesn't have, he doesn't put it in the yellow pages and he doesn't put it on the Internet. He just hangs around in the parking lot of Joe's to accommodate people who, and Joe's is near the border and he wants to accommodate people who may take it in the way he wishes to employ him as a straw purchaser. Right, you wouldn't think of prosecuting him, would you? I mean, at a certain point, if the conduct is so pervasive and regular, if he's acting as a dealer, then you might be able to get him on that separate provision, but you're right, before that point, you wouldn't necessarily be able to, and that would be a perfectly lawful conduct. And it's also important to talk, we were talking just as fire about it. Before you go on, I wanted to get back to the Al Capone hypothetical. As I understand Petitioner's case here, he, I don't think he's asserting that if Al Capone, if he intended to transfer it to Al Capone, that his statement would not have been material, his position is since I intended to transfer it to somebody who could lawfully possess it, the statement was immaterial. And my point, Justice Scalia, is that in a straw purchase context, you're not necessarily going to know you're dealing with Al Capone or someone of his record. These are often cases in which people have an ephemeral relationship. They may not even know each other's names. Well, Mr. Palmore, is that right? I thought that Mr. Deeds' argument went beyond what Justice Scalia just said, that for Mr. Deeds, regardless, he might be prosecuted under another statute for selling something to somebody he knows as Al Capone, but that he would be, you know, because he was the guy at the counter, and he was buying for somebody else as to this question of material representation, it does not matter whether the ultimate transfer rate was Al Capone or somebody else. I think that's right, Justice Kagan, and that's his first argument in what I take to be his main submission is essentially that his statement was true. I think he said that just right in the beer. It was true, so you don't even get to the materiality question. So that's right. That subsequent transfer might separately be a violation if he knows or has reasonable cause to believe that the transferee is in a prohibited category. I would just point out, though, that would not have been the case from 1968 to 1986, because 922D, which prohibits transfers to ineligible transferor, I'm sorry, transferees applied only to licensed dealers until 1986. It didn't apply to two private individuals. So the kind of straw purchase on behalf of Al Capone, as I understand it under petitioner's theory, would have been perfectly legal from 1968 to 1986, even if it was knowing. Justice Ginsburg, we talked a little bit before about how ATF's view kind of caught up with the case law, and I think some of that case law is actually quite helpful here for illuminating the materiality question, and it's the chrandal case from the first circuit that we talk about in the brief

. This language is fought over tooth and nail by people on the, you know, gun control side and the gun ownership side. And to say you look at it and say, well, the purpose is this, even though there's no words in the statute that have anything to do with straw purchasers, I think it's very problematic. Well, Your Honor, I think we do have a textual argument which I referred to before, but there's also, it's not just a purpose argument, it's a contextual and structural argument, and it's the one that Justice Alito alluded to. So you agree that from Justice Alito's example, that person is regulated as a gun dealer, right? At a certain point, a person, if they're audiologous, with writing, if they're operating as a seller or firearms, they would have to register. Well, I meant my hypothetical. So he doesn't have, he doesn't put it in the yellow pages and he doesn't put it on the Internet. He just hangs around in the parking lot of Joe's to accommodate people who, and Joe's is near the border and he wants to accommodate people who may take it in the way he wishes to employ him as a straw purchaser. Right, you wouldn't think of prosecuting him, would you? I mean, at a certain point, if the conduct is so pervasive and regular, if he's acting as a dealer, then you might be able to get him on that separate provision, but you're right, before that point, you wouldn't necessarily be able to, and that would be a perfectly lawful conduct. And it's also important to talk, we were talking just as fire about it. Before you go on, I wanted to get back to the Al Capone hypothetical. As I understand Petitioner's case here, he, I don't think he's asserting that if Al Capone, if he intended to transfer it to Al Capone, that his statement would not have been material, his position is since I intended to transfer it to somebody who could lawfully possess it, the statement was immaterial. And my point, Justice Scalia, is that in a straw purchase context, you're not necessarily going to know you're dealing with Al Capone or someone of his record. These are often cases in which people have an ephemeral relationship. They may not even know each other's names. Well, Mr. Palmore, is that right? I thought that Mr. Deeds' argument went beyond what Justice Scalia just said, that for Mr. Deeds, regardless, he might be prosecuted under another statute for selling something to somebody he knows as Al Capone, but that he would be, you know, because he was the guy at the counter, and he was buying for somebody else as to this question of material representation, it does not matter whether the ultimate transfer rate was Al Capone or somebody else. I think that's right, Justice Kagan, and that's his first argument in what I take to be his main submission is essentially that his statement was true. I think he said that just right in the beer. It was true, so you don't even get to the materiality question. So that's right. That subsequent transfer might separately be a violation if he knows or has reasonable cause to believe that the transferee is in a prohibited category. I would just point out, though, that would not have been the case from 1968 to 1986, because 922D, which prohibits transfers to ineligible transferor, I'm sorry, transferees applied only to licensed dealers until 1986. It didn't apply to two private individuals. So the kind of straw purchase on behalf of Al Capone, as I understand it under petitioner's theory, would have been perfectly legal from 1968 to 1986, even if it was knowing. Justice Ginsburg, we talked a little bit before about how ATF's view kind of caught up with the case law, and I think some of that case law is actually quite helpful here for illuminating the materiality question, and it's the chrandal case from the first circuit that we talk about in the brief. If petitioner is correct that the materiality of a false statement turns on whether the ultimate, in this context, whether the ultimate purchaser or the actual transferee of the firearm was eligible or not, it's unclear why someone seeking to buy a gun from a federally regulated dealer couldn't go in, provide a false name, and provide false identification, and receive a gun, and then if he's prosecuted for that false statement, he could defend, as the defendant in chrandal tried to defend, saying, well, it didn't really matter because I'm actually eligible. So even if you'd known my true name and had my true non-forged ID, you would have sold me the gun, so it's not material. The courts of appeals and the lower courts have consistently rejected that argument. And what those courts told is that in all cases, the lawfulness of the sale of a firearm from a regulated dealer is contingent on the recording, confirming, and after 1993 screening of the identity of the purchaser. And this now you're talking about the second question. And the provision that makes the information that's required makes it material, correct me if I'm wrong, is 922 E5, right? That's one of the acquires. Okay, now all that says is you have to keep the information of the person to whom you're transferring the firearm. So your argument has to be when somebody sees the person, they realize that that means not somebody who's buying it for somebody else, right? Right. And if you're with me on this raw purchase idea that this was a false statement because the purpose and effect of the transaction was for the uncle to acquire the firearm, then that was a false statement, then the actual search, I know, if I assume you're right, then you're right. If you assume I'm right on issue one, then I think the materiality on issue two follows directly from this provision that you've quoted 922 B5. And I think because then person you know carries with it the concept of not just the person to whom it's transferred, which is what 922 B5 says, but the fact that it has to be the actual person who ends up with the gun. Yes, and I think the term needs to be looked at in context. It's not just 922 B5, there's also 922 T, which is the Brady provisions. And there talks about it transfers, so we talked before about how they're different from page 13. No, I apologize, Justice Scalia, there's not an appendix, but this is quoted in a relevant part on page 13 of our brief. So 922 T says that the no transfer of a firearm can take place unless the identity of the, of transfer is confirmed with a photo identification, and unless that identity is screened through a database to ensure that that person is eligible to acquire a firearm. So if you're right on question one, 922 T just makes this a slam dunk on question two, and there's a question about whether you're right on question one. But if you are, T says, look, the dealer is supposed to check the transfer rate, right? And if we assume that when Congress says the transfer rate, it's the real transfer rate, not the fake transfer rate, the dealer is supposed to check the real transfer rate. So what does the dealer think is material? I mean, the question is what is a reasonable dealer think is material? I better know who you are so I can check you. That's material. I think that's right, Justice Kagan. I think that anyone looking at 922 B5, Chief Justice Roberts, I can't look at all these things because they're not in your brief. I really, I really resent, especially in statutory cases, not having the statute in front of us. I shouldn't have to flip through your brief to see what page you cite a little snippet from one section of it. You're right, Justice Scalia. I apologize for not including a full of statutory appendix in this brief. But the point is of 922 B5, when it asks for the name of the buyer, one would ask, well, what reason? Why is this name relevant? Why is this question being asked? And this goes to Justice Alito's observation about the structure and purpose of the statute

. If petitioner is correct that the materiality of a false statement turns on whether the ultimate, in this context, whether the ultimate purchaser or the actual transferee of the firearm was eligible or not, it's unclear why someone seeking to buy a gun from a federally regulated dealer couldn't go in, provide a false name, and provide false identification, and receive a gun, and then if he's prosecuted for that false statement, he could defend, as the defendant in chrandal tried to defend, saying, well, it didn't really matter because I'm actually eligible. So even if you'd known my true name and had my true non-forged ID, you would have sold me the gun, so it's not material. The courts of appeals and the lower courts have consistently rejected that argument. And what those courts told is that in all cases, the lawfulness of the sale of a firearm from a regulated dealer is contingent on the recording, confirming, and after 1993 screening of the identity of the purchaser. And this now you're talking about the second question. And the provision that makes the information that's required makes it material, correct me if I'm wrong, is 922 E5, right? That's one of the acquires. Okay, now all that says is you have to keep the information of the person to whom you're transferring the firearm. So your argument has to be when somebody sees the person, they realize that that means not somebody who's buying it for somebody else, right? Right. And if you're with me on this raw purchase idea that this was a false statement because the purpose and effect of the transaction was for the uncle to acquire the firearm, then that was a false statement, then the actual search, I know, if I assume you're right, then you're right. If you assume I'm right on issue one, then I think the materiality on issue two follows directly from this provision that you've quoted 922 B5. And I think because then person you know carries with it the concept of not just the person to whom it's transferred, which is what 922 B5 says, but the fact that it has to be the actual person who ends up with the gun. Yes, and I think the term needs to be looked at in context. It's not just 922 B5, there's also 922 T, which is the Brady provisions. And there talks about it transfers, so we talked before about how they're different from page 13. No, I apologize, Justice Scalia, there's not an appendix, but this is quoted in a relevant part on page 13 of our brief. So 922 T says that the no transfer of a firearm can take place unless the identity of the, of transfer is confirmed with a photo identification, and unless that identity is screened through a database to ensure that that person is eligible to acquire a firearm. So if you're right on question one, 922 T just makes this a slam dunk on question two, and there's a question about whether you're right on question one. But if you are, T says, look, the dealer is supposed to check the transfer rate, right? And if we assume that when Congress says the transfer rate, it's the real transfer rate, not the fake transfer rate, the dealer is supposed to check the real transfer rate. So what does the dealer think is material? I mean, the question is what is a reasonable dealer think is material? I better know who you are so I can check you. That's material. I think that's right, Justice Kagan. I think that anyone looking at 922 B5, Chief Justice Roberts, I can't look at all these things because they're not in your brief. I really, I really resent, especially in statutory cases, not having the statute in front of us. I shouldn't have to flip through your brief to see what page you cite a little snippet from one section of it. You're right, Justice Scalia. I apologize for not including a full of statutory appendix in this brief. But the point is of 922 B5, when it asks for the name of the buyer, one would ask, well, what reason? Why is this name relevant? Why is this question being asked? And this goes to Justice Alito's observation about the structure and purpose of the statute. This name is clearly being asked because Congress cared very much about preventing anonymous sales of firearms. It cared very much about having a record of who that first buyer was. Well, it's not just the structure, it's not just the overriding purpose. 922 D.T. says that the dealer is supposed to check the transfer rate to find out whether the transfer rate has a criminal record, to find out whether the transfer rate has mental illness. So who does he check? Who is the transfer rate? Why need to know who the transfer rate is to make that check? So obviously it's material to know who the transfer rate is. I agree, because those requirements would be pointless if they could be satisfied. Well, but it's going to be the same problem, which is the straw because the transfer rate in context probably refers to the person to whom the dealer transferred the weapon, namely the buyer. And does it apply, for example, if he knows that the buyer is going to give the weapon to another person, and you will say no, and he's not the transfer rate, the other person. You admit that, you say it. And so why is the person to whom a man puts up the cash is going to later transfer the weapon is the same question as to whether he is really the purchaser. I just don't see a difference. And therefore I thought that you can explain to me why there's a difference. I'd like to know that. And I guess I'd like to bring you back to that issue, and I'd just like to know how the ATF reached the contrary conclusion, if it would so undermine the statute. Well, Justice Breyer, a couple points about this. One, as we talked about before, we think Huddleston suggests that these terms and Huddleston was interpreting acquisition and disposition, and it gave, it was stressed that they used had a practical common sense meaning about who was going to obtain possession or control of the firearm as a result of the transaction, as a direct result of the transaction. And what about the doni? The ATF has never interpreted this provision to prohibit gifts, and a gift recipient is in no sense a party to the gift giver's purchase of the gift. That's just not the way we think of gifts. The purchaser may change his mind. The purchaser is not acting at the direction and control of the gift recipient. And in ATF's experience, there's not a problem with gift recipients. You don't think that the crime boss is, I'm sorry. You don't think crime bosses look at their underlings, pay them a lot of money for whatever they're doing, and just say, go get me a gun and give it to me. Well, I think that that, I would suggest that that wouldn't be a gift under that scenario, Justice. So, if that person is working for the crime boss and it's part of his duties to go obtain a gun, then he's buying that gun on behalf of the crime boss

. This name is clearly being asked because Congress cared very much about preventing anonymous sales of firearms. It cared very much about having a record of who that first buyer was. Well, it's not just the structure, it's not just the overriding purpose. 922 D.T. says that the dealer is supposed to check the transfer rate to find out whether the transfer rate has a criminal record, to find out whether the transfer rate has mental illness. So who does he check? Who is the transfer rate? Why need to know who the transfer rate is to make that check? So obviously it's material to know who the transfer rate is. I agree, because those requirements would be pointless if they could be satisfied. Well, but it's going to be the same problem, which is the straw because the transfer rate in context probably refers to the person to whom the dealer transferred the weapon, namely the buyer. And does it apply, for example, if he knows that the buyer is going to give the weapon to another person, and you will say no, and he's not the transfer rate, the other person. You admit that, you say it. And so why is the person to whom a man puts up the cash is going to later transfer the weapon is the same question as to whether he is really the purchaser. I just don't see a difference. And therefore I thought that you can explain to me why there's a difference. I'd like to know that. And I guess I'd like to bring you back to that issue, and I'd just like to know how the ATF reached the contrary conclusion, if it would so undermine the statute. Well, Justice Breyer, a couple points about this. One, as we talked about before, we think Huddleston suggests that these terms and Huddleston was interpreting acquisition and disposition, and it gave, it was stressed that they used had a practical common sense meaning about who was going to obtain possession or control of the firearm as a result of the transaction, as a direct result of the transaction. And what about the doni? The ATF has never interpreted this provision to prohibit gifts, and a gift recipient is in no sense a party to the gift giver's purchase of the gift. That's just not the way we think of gifts. The purchaser may change his mind. The purchaser is not acting at the direction and control of the gift recipient. And in ATF's experience, there's not a problem with gift recipients. You don't think that the crime boss is, I'm sorry. You don't think crime bosses look at their underlings, pay them a lot of money for whatever they're doing, and just say, go get me a gun and give it to me. Well, I think that that, I would suggest that that wouldn't be a gift under that scenario, Justice. So, if that person is working for the crime boss and it's part of his duties to go obtain a gun, then he's buying that gun on behalf of the crime boss. Could you answer Justice Kennedy's question? Is this all contingent on the intent at the moment? I mean, you had a lovely, wrapped case here because you had the money transferred before the purchaser. So, there's no question that the intent was to purchase for the uncle. But what about the situation where there's a conversation beforehand that says, I'm going to buy the gun and I'll sell it to you afterwards? I think the question, there could be a factual question in some of these cases. The question would be, was that purchase made on behalf of someone else? There's no factual issue here. This was a guilty plea, so we have to assume that this transaction was made on behalf of the uncle as a factual matter, petitioner disputes whether that matters legally or not. And I'm not sure what you mean. I gave you a hypothetical. What was it? Right. In your hypothetical, I think that would be a straw purchase. That purchase was made, even if the money was going to come later, that purchase was made on behalf of the absent party, and it can't proceed for a variety of reasons. This is a criminal statute, and you're saying that when I buy it and I told somebody I'll sell it to you later, that I am acting as an agent, and wow, it's a criminal statute. Justice Scalia, in Huddleston, is helpful in this regard, too. There was a notice rule of Lenny argument made there, because the person, in that case, wasn't actually buying the firearm he had pondered to the pawn shop, and he was redeeming it. And he came in and said, I'm not buying it. And I'm just getting my own property back. I'm not buying it or acquiring it. And the Court relied in rejecting that argument, relied in part on Form 4473, because it provided notice that he had to check these boxes and had to truthfully answer the question. I think it's rare that you get a case with this degree of notice when the defendant is actually committing the offense and making the false statement. He's told in bold letters right in front of him not to do what he's about to do, and it includes a hypothesis. He's not told that in the statute. He's told that in a form that was quite different from the form that was used before. That's right, Chief Justice Roberts. It's a form that's been used consistently for 20 years. And for the reasons that we've said, we think that the current view of the ATF and the express instructions on the form are actually the most consistent with the statute, because the statute requires identification of a firearm purchaser to be recorded, confirmed, and screened in every case. That's not contingent on the person turning out to be eligible or not. Congress wanted to prevent anonymous sales of firearms, and it had a purpose, obviously, to keep. And I don't know

. Could you answer Justice Kennedy's question? Is this all contingent on the intent at the moment? I mean, you had a lovely, wrapped case here because you had the money transferred before the purchaser. So, there's no question that the intent was to purchase for the uncle. But what about the situation where there's a conversation beforehand that says, I'm going to buy the gun and I'll sell it to you afterwards? I think the question, there could be a factual question in some of these cases. The question would be, was that purchase made on behalf of someone else? There's no factual issue here. This was a guilty plea, so we have to assume that this transaction was made on behalf of the uncle as a factual matter, petitioner disputes whether that matters legally or not. And I'm not sure what you mean. I gave you a hypothetical. What was it? Right. In your hypothetical, I think that would be a straw purchase. That purchase was made, even if the money was going to come later, that purchase was made on behalf of the absent party, and it can't proceed for a variety of reasons. This is a criminal statute, and you're saying that when I buy it and I told somebody I'll sell it to you later, that I am acting as an agent, and wow, it's a criminal statute. Justice Scalia, in Huddleston, is helpful in this regard, too. There was a notice rule of Lenny argument made there, because the person, in that case, wasn't actually buying the firearm he had pondered to the pawn shop, and he was redeeming it. And he came in and said, I'm not buying it. And I'm just getting my own property back. I'm not buying it or acquiring it. And the Court relied in rejecting that argument, relied in part on Form 4473, because it provided notice that he had to check these boxes and had to truthfully answer the question. I think it's rare that you get a case with this degree of notice when the defendant is actually committing the offense and making the false statement. He's told in bold letters right in front of him not to do what he's about to do, and it includes a hypothesis. He's not told that in the statute. He's told that in a form that was quite different from the form that was used before. That's right, Chief Justice Roberts. It's a form that's been used consistently for 20 years. And for the reasons that we've said, we think that the current view of the ATF and the express instructions on the form are actually the most consistent with the statute, because the statute requires identification of a firearm purchaser to be recorded, confirmed, and screened in every case. That's not contingent on the person turning out to be eligible or not. Congress wanted to prevent anonymous sales of firearms, and it had a purpose, obviously, to keep. And I don't know. There was a sale. Suppose the facts in this case, and it was a gawk, I think, was delivered. And suddenly, the Abramsky finds that it's a valuable collector's item. There were only two or three of these made. It had a special trigger or something. And it's now immensely valuable. Could the uncle insist that it be sold to him for the $700 or for the agreed price for the $400? I think it's not clear, Justice Kennedy, they're not going to be a contract. It isn't, but then there wasn't. Then there was a subsequent sale. Right, but of course, here there's no subsequent sale, because the check was written. Well, I'm asking about that. Right, I think if the petitioner changed his mind and decided not to actually transfer it, I think as a technical matter, that wouldn't affect the legality, because what mattered was, was he making a purchase on behalf of another and entering a false statement at the time he made it? A fact question could arise in a situation like that, which a defendant could argue, I wasn't actually making the purchase on behalf of someone else, and that argument is supported by subsequent events. But I think we were, I was about to say that the one critical purpose of the statute, obviously, was to keep firearms out of the hands of ineligible persons, but another critical purpose was to allow for the tracing of firearms and to prevent the anonymous stockpiling of firearms. And with respect to that purpose, I think the facts of some of the cases underlying the circuit split on the second issue of materiality are quite salient. Those are all cases in which eligible parties wanted to anonymously obtain large quantities of firearms for illicit reasons. They were eligible, but they had, they wanted to not have their name associated with the transaction. So Polk, which is the fifth circuit case, which is actually on petitioner's side, that person wanted to anonymously acquire firearms to create a stockpile to attack an IRS building, to kill police officers, and to assassinate a judge. But he was eligible. In Frazier and Morales, which are the 11th and 6th circuit cases addressing this materiality issue, they were straw purchases on behalf of eligible buyers, but they were, again, wanting to anonymously stockpile weapons and not have their names associated with them because they were smuggling them out of the country. And the petitioner's view of the statute in which a straw purchaser can satisfy the requirement that the first transaction at the point of sale be recorded would completely satisfy the statutory requirements, would greatly impair the ability of ATF to trace firearms and to have an accurate record of who that first purchaser of the firearm was. If there are no further questions, we'd ask that the judgment of the Court of Appeals be affirmed. Thank you, Council. Mr. D, do you have four minutes? Just the Schinsburg. You asked Council whether this was a case, whether there were two interpretations of the statute, Council, and C did that there were. I think that's an important point because of course we're dealing with a criminal statute. If there are two interpretations under very well-settle precedent from this Court, the Court applies the interpretation that's favorable to the criminal defendant, and that's part of the doctrine of criminal law

. There was a sale. Suppose the facts in this case, and it was a gawk, I think, was delivered. And suddenly, the Abramsky finds that it's a valuable collector's item. There were only two or three of these made. It had a special trigger or something. And it's now immensely valuable. Could the uncle insist that it be sold to him for the $700 or for the agreed price for the $400? I think it's not clear, Justice Kennedy, they're not going to be a contract. It isn't, but then there wasn't. Then there was a subsequent sale. Right, but of course, here there's no subsequent sale, because the check was written. Well, I'm asking about that. Right, I think if the petitioner changed his mind and decided not to actually transfer it, I think as a technical matter, that wouldn't affect the legality, because what mattered was, was he making a purchase on behalf of another and entering a false statement at the time he made it? A fact question could arise in a situation like that, which a defendant could argue, I wasn't actually making the purchase on behalf of someone else, and that argument is supported by subsequent events. But I think we were, I was about to say that the one critical purpose of the statute, obviously, was to keep firearms out of the hands of ineligible persons, but another critical purpose was to allow for the tracing of firearms and to prevent the anonymous stockpiling of firearms. And with respect to that purpose, I think the facts of some of the cases underlying the circuit split on the second issue of materiality are quite salient. Those are all cases in which eligible parties wanted to anonymously obtain large quantities of firearms for illicit reasons. They were eligible, but they had, they wanted to not have their name associated with the transaction. So Polk, which is the fifth circuit case, which is actually on petitioner's side, that person wanted to anonymously acquire firearms to create a stockpile to attack an IRS building, to kill police officers, and to assassinate a judge. But he was eligible. In Frazier and Morales, which are the 11th and 6th circuit cases addressing this materiality issue, they were straw purchases on behalf of eligible buyers, but they were, again, wanting to anonymously stockpile weapons and not have their names associated with them because they were smuggling them out of the country. And the petitioner's view of the statute in which a straw purchaser can satisfy the requirement that the first transaction at the point of sale be recorded would completely satisfy the statutory requirements, would greatly impair the ability of ATF to trace firearms and to have an accurate record of who that first purchaser of the firearm was. If there are no further questions, we'd ask that the judgment of the Court of Appeals be affirmed. Thank you, Council. Mr. D, do you have four minutes? Just the Schinsburg. You asked Council whether this was a case, whether there were two interpretations of the statute, Council, and C did that there were. I think that's an important point because of course we're dealing with a criminal statute. If there are two interpretations under very well-settle precedent from this Court, the Court applies the interpretation that's favorable to the criminal defendant, and that's part of the doctrine of criminal law. Justice Kennedy, you mentioned the agency situation that existed here between Mr. Abrams and his uncle, and here I think it's important to note that there wasn't even any consideration. This was truly a purchase, it was just a favor for a family member in the government in order to advance this straw purchase or theory that historically came from civil common law. There needs to be a relationship between Mr. Abramsky and his uncle that is a fiduciary relationship, or Mr. Abramsky is required to act in his uncle's best interests at all times. And that, for example, if he left the gun store and someone said, hey, did you just pick up a glock, I'll buy it for you for $500. Mr. Abramsky could not even enter into that sale without providing his uncle with any money he made from that sale. There's a complex set of civil agency law principles that apply here that just don't translate to this straw purchase or doctrine as we've described it, and I think that's a fundamental flaw in the government's theories that the courts have never thought through all of the various situations that apply in these fiduciary relationships and how you would apply them, the situations where you're just buying a gun for a family member or something of that nature. I also wanted to turn to the gift exception. There's also another exception, the government acknowledges, and that's for raffles and contests at charities or political fundraisers. And so in that circumstance, the person who's buying the gun knows that they're giving it to a complete stranger, and someone who by random chance wins the right to own the gun. But in those cases, the government says there's no need at the time that you buy the gun to take any steps to ensure there's record keeping or a background check on that person. And I think that undermines this idea that everyone receiving a gun as it's in the chain from the gun dealer, Congress wants to have a background check. Congress is concerned about providing enough information to allow for tracing and nothing more. And as a final point, Your Honor, I think perhaps the most important point is in this case, is that the court rejects the straw purchase or doctrine as it applies in this case to a lawful gun owner buying for another. There are really no harmful consequences. The government retains a very robust toolbox of criminal statutes to prosecute illegal straw purchasers, those who buy guns to get them into the hands of prohibited persons, and the government will receive accurate, truthful information about that first sale so they can trace firearms when they're used in the commission of a crime. So the only thing that straw purchaser doctrine, in this case, really accomplishes is to prohibit a law-biting citizens from buying guns for other law-biting citizens. And that's something that Congress expressly chose not to do, and we would ask this court to remain faithful to the statutory scheme actually enacted by the law. Sotomayor, would the government have to prove that the person to whom the straw purchaser transferred the gun was ineligible, or would it be a defense if it was shown that the person was eligible? I think the government would have the burden there, Your Honor, and I think the government had suggested that they provided an example of a circumstance where the person who bought the gun was buying it for someone named, I believe, Almanio, who had no idea who that was. But yes, in that circumstance, the government would need to prove that that person was prohibited. But I think in circumstances like that, where you're buying guns for someone you don't even know who that person is, the government may well have evidence in that case that you either knew or had reasonable cause to believe that that person was prohibited from possessing the gun. But the other purpose that they said this provision has is to get gun dealers to run checks. And you can't run a check if the name isn't there? That's right, Ronnie. Of course, you can't run a check on someone who wins the gun in a raffle or a check

. But the other problem that we're back to the language, they say your client falls within the language and you say it doesn't. All right, quick. Thank you, counsel. Case is submitted