Good morning, yours, and may it be the court's name is Yuri Klasnikov, and here on behalf of the plaintiff, I'm like a scunk in. I'd like to read the fronness for the battle. Could you be sure to speak mildly, as you're taller than the microphones? Yes, Yara. Thank you. The discussion rivers and reminds for four independent-laced efficient reasons. So, how helped me first on jurisdiction? We have some cases that have been more tolerant than the cases from some other circuits on when a proposed class action becomes moot. They usually have some other element, like in one of them, if the settling plaintiff had gotten the class action decision not to certify overturned, he'd get a substantial amount of money, I think it was $20,000. There could be various cases where he retained some personal interest. In this case, my understanding of the settlement agreement was if you win, you lose, whatever happens, the champion's not going to get a penny, nor does he have any deal where any of his expenses of litigation are going to be reimbursed, or for that matter, any indication that he has expenses of litigation. His counsel certainly does. This was hard fought. And counsel would be compensated if plaintiff prevailed, but I can't see where champion gets a thing. He sure can't get an injunction because he's not going to get any more appliances. He's not going to be called an old-republic protection company to cover any more appliances. I just can't see where there's any dismissal without prejudice. Sure, in some circumstances, dismissal with prejudice, dismissal without prejudice, occasionally we have a very convoluted case where you can appeal either way
. But usually all dismissal without prejudice means is find yourself another plaintiff and file another case. And in this case, I think plaintiff's counsel has done that. And there's another case pending in district court with another putative class action plaintiff. What's in it for champion? Well, you're on a specific in a letter, but he still returns a personal stake under the nice, okay, law. What personal stake? I know you said that, and I know we have cases that say there can be a retained personal stake, but I couldn't figure out what it was. Well, one of them is seeing the classification decision to the end. So I've seen it to the end. You mean the personal stake of feeling good? Well, one is getting the classification ruling reversed, but what would it matter to him if he got it reversed? He wouldn't get a nickel. Well, he wouldn't get a nickel, but the class would be, would get a relief. Rest of the class, not him. Correct. Anything that the case is correct? He wouldn't get a nickel. He would not get a nickel now that he has sourced his personal individual claim for damages. So besides the satisfaction of seeing it to the end, what's in it for him? Well, it's too far, Deona. And once we say it in a brief, if he, the cases are nice, I mean, I say pretty clearly
. Even his individual claim is more, it doesn't matter to the classification decision. He can represent the class. So he has a personal stake in getting the classification ruling reversed, reminded him getting the class verified. Even if he has a clear class representative, if he settled out. Well, I guess that would be a different wish to cross once we come back to district work, if this court progresses. And then I think some would case allow another individual to come in and substitute themselves who have a still a viable stake for damages as a class representative. But I think that I said this is... Well, the theory of our previous cases, whether it's right or wrong, seems to be that there is an interest in being a private attorney general and an interest in preventing the defendant from picking off each potential plaintiff because they're claimed as small and they can be paid off. I mean, that's the theory behind it. That's it. I see that's correct. But how the cases.
.. And I don't know if that's right, but we're bound by those cases. But I'm interested as Judge Kleinfeld is in whether there is any sort of financial stake left, whether it be expenses or something like that on the part of the individual plaintiff. Well, that's used to forward you on. One is, what I think the nice of your case is that requires for that to be an financial stake left. I think as you want to mention... I understand that. I'm asking you. There is, you know, that's actually... There is. As you mentioned, the company's proceeding in the private attorney general
. He and his counsel are undertaking the pursuit of this litigation. So as a case of the... Well, his counsel certainly has a stake, but that's different from the champion. Well, I think the case of deciding a letter, we say that if the class representative, the interest in spending out of the cost of the litigation to the class... The way a settlement agreement could read is his costs will be reimbursed out of the class, but I think the way the settlement did read in this case, they won't be. Not champions' costs, not anything champion had to pay his lawyer. Well, I think it's a focus solely on the plaintiff's expenses. It's plaintiff or the counsel. I think the case of deciding a letter, we say that if plaintiff or his counsel have..
. And they have an interest of distributing the cost of the litigation onto the class, if there is successful classification down the line. So I think under the case of deciding that he still has a sufficient personal stake in addition to getting the classified in the pursuit of having a life controversy. I would... I'm assuming we have jurisdiction. I'd appreciate your commenting on whether the district court was wrong to conclude that insurance policies are not services under the California statute. You refer to the CIA claim and one, we would disagree that those are insurance services. I think as we noted in our brief, there is a big distinction and whole-wanty companies including all the public have pointed those issues out to the California legislature why a home protection contract is different than an insurance. And then it's important to note that the CIA was enacted to alleviate social and economic problems stemmed from the section, the sector of business practices, or to consumers. And it allows... If I had to show an unfair and deceptive acts and practices, I would take it to sell at least goods or services. But, Councillor, we don't have a blank slate on what the CLRA means
. So let's talk about the Fairbanks case. And you would agree that the Fairbanks case, the California Supreme Court said that life insurance is not a service, correct? That's correct, Your Honor. Under your reading of the CLRA is Fairbanks limited to life insurance? Is there any other service that... Or I shouldn't use the word services. Is there any other commodity or financial arrangement that would also fall within Fairbanks? Yes, Your Honor. I think Fairbanks were ideally looked to the plain meaning of the statute. They looked to goods or services and then looked to the definition of those words in the statute. What does the services mean? Services means work, labor, and services other than for commercial business purpose. So, looked at the specific plain language in the statute and looked at the case before it, in that case, like you said, life insurance. And so, does life insurance, which is a contract of indemnity, which is limited to a contractual obligation to pay money, is that good of service? In conclusion, isn't the obligation here really just to pay money? They reserved to themselves the right to either send somebody out to fix it or to just pay for it if it's covered. If the price of plumbers and electricians rose to a love and appliance repairman rose to a level where it was always cheaper to just replace it, as I read the service agreement they could just do that. Well, no, Your Honor. No, to be a first question
. Yes, yes, yes. And like, when you see a warranty, the company thinks it's the item you send back to them or they can just give you a new one. Well, Your Honor, but this is different than a life insurance. Life insurance, you only have an obligation to pay money. If I'm a guy, you pay out. That's all your obligations. But Council, what about something like, let's say, a personal articles floater in a homeowners policy? Would you agree that that's insurance? Where they insure you personal goods. Like my wife's wedding. My wife's wedding. Yeah, my wife's wedding money. My wife's wedding money. Well, we depend on the specific terms of, but we're not significantly sure. Because that's a very similar situation. I have, let's say, Joe and his wife lose us her wedding ring down the garbage disposal. That would be very bad, by the way
. Well, that would be very bad in many respects. But most of those policies, instead of just paying money, will give them the option to the insurance company, the option to require you to have them replace or repair the item. Before they'll pay the money. Does that make it not insurance? Correct, you and him. I think that you would argue that pretty much, I think, everything but life insurance would. My car insurance. Fire insurance. They, they, they accept the house if it's paper or they just pay for it. It's more expensive. Right, you and us. I mean, you look as a principal object of what you have in front of you. And is the principal object is just a contract obligation to pay money that is insurance if all under Fairbanks and social services. So under your theory, none of these policies would even be covered by the insurance code. It sounds like because you wouldn't view them as insurance. Well, I think it's a good thing
. Is that right? What's a different question, you know, with respect to the home-oriented company, home-oriented plans, is that covered with the insurance code to an extent, the specific exceptions to which section of the insurance code do not apply to home-oriented contracts? So this is most insurance that people have, I think, collision and comprehensive. They can either fix your car or total it out, which means they just pay for it. Fire insurance, they can either fix your house or pay for it. And it looks like this appliance insurance here is the same thing. They can fix it or pay for it. No, you know, I mean, the whole point of getting home-oriented contracts is to get a low cost repair, a replacement, an article when it breaks down from a pre-qualified, from a pre-screen, a qualified contract. I mean, that's what the whole point of this insurance of this home-oriented contract is. However, it does not just obligate itself to pay out. Where it promises what it gets consumers, how it gets consumers to buy the plan, it promises we will one, we will pre-screen and retain qualified contracts, that's the service. Second, let's see, I'm sorry. Second, it will take in the call from the consumer. Without requiring them to, I mean, usually we don't have a plan. What do you do? You go to anxious list, you go to yellow pages, you have to go and you have to find a reputable contract for yourself. All the public prevents the consumers from worrying about that. They say, we'll take this responsibility, we'll do the service for you
. They take the call from the consumer. They took a profit campaign. They went out and they found a contractor or is this planning to send them out to a company's house. That's the service. It's something more than an obligation to pay money. They took an service too. Let's not like just taking your card to a body shop. The insurance company likes. If there is provision in the oil show and the will take and the will pay your car, the will pay the car. That's the service. I think I'm a true side of that. You look at the principal object and that will be, if the principal object is a service that's supposed to be the salary. I mean, I understand where you're coming from. I don't see any of this in the Fairbanks case. Is there another case we should look at that you recommend that would explain or support the theory you're offering? Because I have to say, my wife was in a car accident a few months ago and I always thought it was insurance and now you're telling me it wasn't insurance. So is there a case we can look at that supports this argument you're making? I think I was a true side of that. I believe one, eight, three, car, absurd, eight or two. I mean, talked about collision damage rate but were not being insurance because the principal object and purposes of production was the rental. And I decided that I believe, and also some of the other cases like the short cases, like her and the services help up, which talk about services related to mortgage loan or the mortgage loan itself, the original money services related to that, like underwriting origenation processing, the district will have that to be service under the salary. Yes, so you're down to about a minute. Did you want to save some rebelling time? I do, Your Honor. Okay, thank you. Good morning, Your Honor. I'm Jay Varen from Folian Lardner for the defendant, Old Republican Protection. I'm going to assume that there's jurisdiction and we're talking about the merits I deal. As I understand your deal, you're not free to argue that there is not jurisdiction because you're a settlement agreement. Is that right? That's how I believe that's right, yes. I ask you about the California statute issue here because the text covers work, labor, and services, and then I'll skip some words, including services furnished in connection with the repair of goods. And Fairbanks is about life insurance, which clearly has nothing to do with repair of goods, but here the plan, the whole plan of it is to give customers a service if their tangible goods require repair. And there is sort of a general presumption in the statute that the statute is to be liberally construed to help consumers
. So is there a case we can look at that supports this argument you're making? I think I was a true side of that. I believe one, eight, three, car, absurd, eight or two. I mean, talked about collision damage rate but were not being insurance because the principal object and purposes of production was the rental. And I decided that I believe, and also some of the other cases like the short cases, like her and the services help up, which talk about services related to mortgage loan or the mortgage loan itself, the original money services related to that, like underwriting origenation processing, the district will have that to be service under the salary. Yes, so you're down to about a minute. Did you want to save some rebelling time? I do, Your Honor. Okay, thank you. Good morning, Your Honor. I'm Jay Varen from Folian Lardner for the defendant, Old Republican Protection. I'm going to assume that there's jurisdiction and we're talking about the merits I deal. As I understand your deal, you're not free to argue that there is not jurisdiction because you're a settlement agreement. Is that right? That's how I believe that's right, yes. I ask you about the California statute issue here because the text covers work, labor, and services, and then I'll skip some words, including services furnished in connection with the repair of goods. And Fairbanks is about life insurance, which clearly has nothing to do with repair of goods, but here the plan, the whole plan of it is to give customers a service if their tangible goods require repair. And there is sort of a general presumption in the statute that the statute is to be liberally construed to help consumers. So why wouldn't we anticipate that the California Supreme Court would differentiate this situation from Fairbanks? I think Your Honor, because the essence of the plan is, as I think you earlier questions of the panel suggested, is really insurance. Fairbanks talking about a contract. I know I could see how it's two things. One thing that occurred to me on this case was it's kind of like AAA. You get a flat. If you don't feel like getting out of your car, fixing it on the freeway in the rain, you just call AAA and they take care of it. The little different I think Your Honor, because you're still, you're not at A's in assuming any risk. The whole reason that the home warranty contract here is regulated by the California Insurance Department and falls within the Fairbanks rationale, is that it's an assumption of risk just like maybe it's not pure insurance, it's analogous to insurance, it's regulated by insurance and the deal is you pay us this fixed fee premium and we will assume the risk of worrying about if you're in your appliances or other covered items break. If they do, we will either pay for them or as Your Honor said replace them. I have some curiosity about why the court in Fairbanks was so adamant about limiting its decision to life insurance and in a way that at first made no sense to me because many of the arguments concerning the evolution of the statute and the deletion from the model code of the word insurance and so forth would apply to any form of insurance, but it could also be that they were concerned about other forms of insurance that had as an adjunct the provision of goods or services in lieu of payment and so how can we be sure that the California Supreme Court wouldn't treat this type of insurance differently? Well, Your Honor, I think you can be reasonably confident. First of all, I mean, they could have just limited to life insurance because as you know, courts are very careful and they take on the use of the reform. But they might have had the same. The son that the analysis would differ. They might have, but there's no nothing in the opinion that suggests that they did and if you look at the opinion, I mean, it's pretty clear that they concluded that insurance of all kinds was not to be viewed as part of a service in the state of the court. They didn't say it, but their analysis screens it
. So why wouldn't we anticipate that the California Supreme Court would differentiate this situation from Fairbanks? I think Your Honor, because the essence of the plan is, as I think you earlier questions of the panel suggested, is really insurance. Fairbanks talking about a contract. I know I could see how it's two things. One thing that occurred to me on this case was it's kind of like AAA. You get a flat. If you don't feel like getting out of your car, fixing it on the freeway in the rain, you just call AAA and they take care of it. The little different I think Your Honor, because you're still, you're not at A's in assuming any risk. The whole reason that the home warranty contract here is regulated by the California Insurance Department and falls within the Fairbanks rationale, is that it's an assumption of risk just like maybe it's not pure insurance, it's analogous to insurance, it's regulated by insurance and the deal is you pay us this fixed fee premium and we will assume the risk of worrying about if you're in your appliances or other covered items break. If they do, we will either pay for them or as Your Honor said replace them. I have some curiosity about why the court in Fairbanks was so adamant about limiting its decision to life insurance and in a way that at first made no sense to me because many of the arguments concerning the evolution of the statute and the deletion from the model code of the word insurance and so forth would apply to any form of insurance, but it could also be that they were concerned about other forms of insurance that had as an adjunct the provision of goods or services in lieu of payment and so how can we be sure that the California Supreme Court wouldn't treat this type of insurance differently? Well, Your Honor, I think you can be reasonably confident. First of all, I mean, they could have just limited to life insurance because as you know, courts are very careful and they take on the use of the reform. But they might have had the same. The son that the analysis would differ. They might have, but there's no nothing in the opinion that suggests that they did and if you look at the opinion, I mean, it's pretty clear that they concluded that insurance of all kinds was not to be viewed as part of a service in the state of the court. They didn't say it, but their analysis screens it. They look at the definition of the statute, and they look at the legislative history. Right, but I just read you part of the definition that fits your situation and doesn't fit life insurance. I don't think so, Your Honor, because all it, I mean, what it does is it happens to say that the repair of goods in any other service fits the statute. But we're doing that in a claims model. I mean, just- You don't have a California Supreme Court case on product warranties, right? We don't have a California Supreme Court case on home warranty. We have lots of district court cases on other cases, but everybody who's construed, Fairbanks has concluded that automobile vehicle contracts that home warranty contracts all fit within Fairbanks, and for good reason, because in each of those instances, the company is assuming the same kind of risk. Many of the people who buy home warranty contracts never get any service from it. They just get the satisfaction, the lack of worry, that if they need repair, they're not going to go broke fixing it. And that's the essence of insurance. I mean, even in life insurance, there are all kinds of services. Not exactly. Exactly. Some insurance protects against catastrophe, like life insurance. And some insurance protects against pretty affordable risks, like an extended product warrant. Exactly
. They look at the definition of the statute, and they look at the legislative history. Right, but I just read you part of the definition that fits your situation and doesn't fit life insurance. I don't think so, Your Honor, because all it, I mean, what it does is it happens to say that the repair of goods in any other service fits the statute. But we're doing that in a claims model. I mean, just- You don't have a California Supreme Court case on product warranties, right? We don't have a California Supreme Court case on home warranty. We have lots of district court cases on other cases, but everybody who's construed, Fairbanks has concluded that automobile vehicle contracts that home warranty contracts all fit within Fairbanks, and for good reason, because in each of those instances, the company is assuming the same kind of risk. Many of the people who buy home warranty contracts never get any service from it. They just get the satisfaction, the lack of worry, that if they need repair, they're not going to go broke fixing it. And that's the essence of insurance. I mean, even in life insurance, there are all kinds of services. Not exactly. Exactly. Some insurance protects against catastrophe, like life insurance. And some insurance protects against pretty affordable risks, like an extended product warrant. Exactly. And if your iPhone breaks or gosh, people get extended warranties on things a lot cheaper than that, that anybody who could buy the thing in the first place could replace. That's correct, Jim. So it really varies. A lot of insurance isn't catastrophe insurance. A lot of insurance isn't catastrophe, but it's all assumption of the risk. It's all about transference of the risk from the consumer, the policy holder, to the company. And given that the Model Act had insurance in it. A builder's warranty? No, the Model Act. Model Act, which the CLRA was based, had insurance originally in it when the California legislature adopted it, they took insurance out. That was an important factor in the Fairbanks decision. And we're- Where something can at least arguably be understood as being both insurance and the furnishing of services and connection with the repair of goods. How can we be certain what the legislature intended, or at least how the California Supreme Court would interpret it? I think your honor that, again, it's if you take the proposition that I think Fairbanks shows you that insurance services were not to be poured the CLRA, like they were in the Unra Act by contrast. Then you look to see whether this is a situation like plaintiff's counsel cited where Home Depot agrees to resurface somebody's cabinets. Yes, that's what the CLRA was supposed to cover. But if it's port of a home protection plan or an extended warranty plan and there happens to be service associated with it that right independently be a service, that's not enough
. And if your iPhone breaks or gosh, people get extended warranties on things a lot cheaper than that, that anybody who could buy the thing in the first place could replace. That's correct, Jim. So it really varies. A lot of insurance isn't catastrophe insurance. A lot of insurance isn't catastrophe, but it's all assumption of the risk. It's all about transference of the risk from the consumer, the policy holder, to the company. And given that the Model Act had insurance in it. A builder's warranty? No, the Model Act. Model Act, which the CLRA was based, had insurance originally in it when the California legislature adopted it, they took insurance out. That was an important factor in the Fairbanks decision. And we're- Where something can at least arguably be understood as being both insurance and the furnishing of services and connection with the repair of goods. How can we be certain what the legislature intended, or at least how the California Supreme Court would interpret it? I think your honor that, again, it's if you take the proposition that I think Fairbanks shows you that insurance services were not to be poured the CLRA, like they were in the Unra Act by contrast. Then you look to see whether this is a situation like plaintiff's counsel cited where Home Depot agrees to resurface somebody's cabinets. Yes, that's what the CLRA was supposed to cover. But if it's port of a home protection plan or an extended warranty plan and there happens to be service associated with it that right independently be a service, that's not enough. And- Well, if we are uncertain of whether the California Supreme Court would extend Fairbanks to this situation, should we certify a question to the California Supreme Court? Well, your honor. I guess the question is how uncertain are you? I mean, sure, if you are uncertain, courts of this kind certify questions to the California Supreme Court. But I would respectfully suggest to you that the- Given the decisions that have come out on this, all the courts that have looked at it have concluded that these kinds of extended warranty policies, plans, they all have service associated with them. But the key aspect of them is this risk transference. And here, the- not only does the California insurance department regulate home protection plans and home protection companies. The plaintiffs complaint is littered with allegations that we violated the insurance code. I mean, I don't think this is the situation that you would certify a question to the California Supreme Court. I don't know about that. That means anything. I mean, you complete a case. You can say, you negligently count, claim one, you negligently hit my car, count two, you ran into my car on purpose. That- that's true, Your Honor. You can plead in the alternative. I grant you, but it still is a situation where every court who- that's looked at it, except the Edelsson State Court decision, which was decided before Fairbanks, has concluded that these kinds of plans are insurance- or insurance-like and are uncovered by the CLRA. And the reason that they've all done that is that when you look at the Fairbanks decision, it- it leaps out at you in terms of that's what the decision is
. And- Well, if we are uncertain of whether the California Supreme Court would extend Fairbanks to this situation, should we certify a question to the California Supreme Court? Well, your honor. I guess the question is how uncertain are you? I mean, sure, if you are uncertain, courts of this kind certify questions to the California Supreme Court. But I would respectfully suggest to you that the- Given the decisions that have come out on this, all the courts that have looked at it have concluded that these kinds of extended warranty policies, plans, they all have service associated with them. But the key aspect of them is this risk transference. And here, the- not only does the California insurance department regulate home protection plans and home protection companies. The plaintiffs complaint is littered with allegations that we violated the insurance code. I mean, I don't think this is the situation that you would certify a question to the California Supreme Court. I don't know about that. That means anything. I mean, you complete a case. You can say, you negligently count, claim one, you negligently hit my car, count two, you ran into my car on purpose. That- that's true, Your Honor. You can plead in the alternative. I grant you, but it still is a situation where every court who- that's looked at it, except the Edelsson State Court decision, which was decided before Fairbanks, has concluded that these kinds of plans are insurance- or insurance-like and are uncovered by the CLRA. And the reason that they've all done that is that when you look at the Fairbanks decision, it- it leaps out at you in terms of that's what the decision is. So, I would respectfully suggest that the district court's analysis here is correct, and it's in line with all the other court since Fairbanks that have done it. If your honors are truly uncertain, I guess, you know, certification to the California Supreme Court is something that- that you could do. But again, my- my- my position is that I think you can get there without that. Well, let me ask you, Castle. Let's assume that your reading of the CLRA is correct. If I am a consumer and I buy a home warranty, and let's say the total, I'm not saying you're a client, but a total sham company, and I call them up, my perforator's not working, and just no one shows up. Under California law, if the CLRA is not available for me, what would be my remedy? What action could I take? Well, the plan is to file about 16 different accounts here on of his. Reach a contract, there's UCL, there's fraud, those- those three leap- leap- to mind, misrepresentation, I mean, the Friedman complaint, then this first complaint are littered with other claims than the CLRA. There's certainly a wide number of means that the consumers could get. And this is gonna- a little lot topic here, but are you aware of any case law involving home warranties in that aspect? So, put aside CLRA, are you aware of any courts analyzing whether those actions can be brought under the theories you just described? Well, I think these cases do that, Your Honor. I mean, it depends on the allegations. Part of the problem is that a lot of times we have plaintiffs bringing claims like this one where standing is suspect, with is suing on behalf of people that haven't dealt with the company or haven't seen the advertisement that they say is false. But certainly, Reach a contract has been a solid claim. Mr. Campion had a claim for restitution here that was not taken away from him
. So, I would respectfully suggest that the district court's analysis here is correct, and it's in line with all the other court since Fairbanks that have done it. If your honors are truly uncertain, I guess, you know, certification to the California Supreme Court is something that- that you could do. But again, my- my- my position is that I think you can get there without that. Well, let me ask you, Castle. Let's assume that your reading of the CLRA is correct. If I am a consumer and I buy a home warranty, and let's say the total, I'm not saying you're a client, but a total sham company, and I call them up, my perforator's not working, and just no one shows up. Under California law, if the CLRA is not available for me, what would be my remedy? What action could I take? Well, the plan is to file about 16 different accounts here on of his. Reach a contract, there's UCL, there's fraud, those- those three leap- leap- to mind, misrepresentation, I mean, the Friedman complaint, then this first complaint are littered with other claims than the CLRA. There's certainly a wide number of means that the consumers could get. And this is gonna- a little lot topic here, but are you aware of any case law involving home warranties in that aspect? So, put aside CLRA, are you aware of any courts analyzing whether those actions can be brought under the theories you just described? Well, I think these cases do that, Your Honor. I mean, it depends on the allegations. Part of the problem is that a lot of times we have plaintiffs bringing claims like this one where standing is suspect, with is suing on behalf of people that haven't dealt with the company or haven't seen the advertisement that they say is false. But certainly, Reach a contract has been a solid claim. Mr. Campion had a claim for restitution here that was not taken away from him. It was decided that it couldn't proceed on a class basis, which I think is correct. And that's, you know, another argument that's been made, but I think the Walmart case and the Costco case pretty clearly showed that the class certification decision was correct. But certainly, Mr. Campion had the individual claim for relief and that claim was settled and if it was brought as an individual claim, it would probably win every time because who can afford to litigate it for one thing. So I think that there is a measure of relief that consumers have, but the CLRA, I don't believe is one of them. I don't think I need to say a lot about the standing issue. I mean, I think hang on. What you do with a fly-by-night insurer. So what you do with a fly-by-night insurer, like those outfits that sell secondary extended lollities on your car, is you don't sue them under the CLRA, you just sue them for fraud and breach of contract. On one of the things that you complain to the insurance department, then you complain to the Attorney General's office and, you know, if they're fly-by-night, they get dealt with it. As far as your personal remuneration, the problem, of course, with fly-by-night companies is that they don't necessarily have a lot of assets, but that's not a reason I think to broaden the CLRA beyond where it was supposed to be based on, I think, the legislators' legislation's decision to take out insurance. Have there been some California cases that you're aware of from California Court of Appeal on other companies where it's kind of mixed, like one reason you call AAA is to get your car taken care of. Another reason is they know which garage is reliable enough to take care of your flat. The secondary outfits that sell extended lollities on cars, if you don't get the manufacturers' extended warranty, the idea is usually to get your car fixed rather than to pay for anything. Some dealers will fix it and some won't
. It was decided that it couldn't proceed on a class basis, which I think is correct. And that's, you know, another argument that's been made, but I think the Walmart case and the Costco case pretty clearly showed that the class certification decision was correct. But certainly, Mr. Campion had the individual claim for relief and that claim was settled and if it was brought as an individual claim, it would probably win every time because who can afford to litigate it for one thing. So I think that there is a measure of relief that consumers have, but the CLRA, I don't believe is one of them. I don't think I need to say a lot about the standing issue. I mean, I think hang on. What you do with a fly-by-night insurer. So what you do with a fly-by-night insurer, like those outfits that sell secondary extended lollities on your car, is you don't sue them under the CLRA, you just sue them for fraud and breach of contract. On one of the things that you complain to the insurance department, then you complain to the Attorney General's office and, you know, if they're fly-by-night, they get dealt with it. As far as your personal remuneration, the problem, of course, with fly-by-night companies is that they don't necessarily have a lot of assets, but that's not a reason I think to broaden the CLRA beyond where it was supposed to be based on, I think, the legislators' legislation's decision to take out insurance. Have there been some California cases that you're aware of from California Court of Appeal on other companies where it's kind of mixed, like one reason you call AAA is to get your car taken care of. Another reason is they know which garage is reliable enough to take care of your flat. The secondary outfits that sell extended lollities on cars, if you don't get the manufacturers' extended warranty, the idea is usually to get your car fixed rather than to pay for anything. Some dealers will fix it and some won't. Are there other California Court of Appeal cases on these companies that are kind of mixed service and insurance? I know that there are two district court decisions against choice manufacturing company that I think we cited in our briefs in which in each instance the automobile vehicle contract or the automobile warranty that was sold separately was said not to be subject to the CLRA for the same reasons that basically Diaz and the district court here in the District Court in Kaplan all decided that it was outside of the CLRA. So that's the extent of it. I would just say you're honor that in terms of what's out there in the marketplace, I think it's all kinds. There are. I've certainly seen advertisements that ask you to do something like the home protection plan, especially with people who hold cars for seven or eight years. They make a pitch that they're going to break. If you pay them this one flat fee, you won't have to worry about it. And then there are other people that just want you to repair their car there. And I think that's a big difference because one is risk transference and the other is a direct service. I think I've covered the three prongs. I would just say I guess I'm on the fourth, which is the contention that the district court should have permitted the motion to amend. The district court wrote a very comprehensive and detailed decision. Generally, the court provides a great discretion. And there's really no reason to upset its findings there. There was not good cause here
. Are there other California Court of Appeal cases on these companies that are kind of mixed service and insurance? I know that there are two district court decisions against choice manufacturing company that I think we cited in our briefs in which in each instance the automobile vehicle contract or the automobile warranty that was sold separately was said not to be subject to the CLRA for the same reasons that basically Diaz and the district court here in the District Court in Kaplan all decided that it was outside of the CLRA. So that's the extent of it. I would just say you're honor that in terms of what's out there in the marketplace, I think it's all kinds. There are. I've certainly seen advertisements that ask you to do something like the home protection plan, especially with people who hold cars for seven or eight years. They make a pitch that they're going to break. If you pay them this one flat fee, you won't have to worry about it. And then there are other people that just want you to repair their car there. And I think that's a big difference because one is risk transference and the other is a direct service. I think I've covered the three prongs. I would just say I guess I'm on the fourth, which is the contention that the district court should have permitted the motion to amend. The district court wrote a very comprehensive and detailed decision. Generally, the court provides a great discretion. And there's really no reason to upset its findings there. There was not good cause here. There was not due diligence. The plaintiffs waited until the very end after or summary judgment motion was completely briefed to all of a sudden try to amend the complaint. The allegations that they labeled were new were in the original complaint as the district court pointed out. The allegations to amend the class were very similar to the ones that had been rejected as feudal in the first place and even had their been a slight difference doing it at the very end of the case after we had briefed the summary judgment motion to get rid of the individual claims was undue delay. It prejudiced us. And I think it was and I think it was feudal even though the district court didn't decide on that. Thank you, Council. Thank you very much, Your Honor. Mr. Colasnikov, you have a little bit of time remaining. Thank you, Your Honor. How do we know that Supreme Court in Fairbanks meant to limit the decision to life insurance? We can look to the court appeal decision below and I would like to call from the decision. An insurance contract is not something that came to a haircut at plumbing repair. There are two year warranty on the microwave oven. It is simply an agreement to pay if and when an identifiable event occurs
. That's 64 Cal report, a third, 623, 627. So the court appeal below distinguished life insurance from a plumbing repair and a warranty on a microwave. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision and we can, by your specific words, life insurance and analyzing if life insurance costs a service, it's pretty clear the Supreme Court met what it said that life insurance is not service under the CLA. Also, when I address your point, Your Honor, and if you believe that there is unclear case law in this matter, the court will be to certify this issue to the court for the Supreme Court. Thank you, Council. Your time has expired. Once again, we thank both Council for a very helpful presentation and the case is submitted