Legal Case Summary

Jeffrey Gray v. Frederick County, Maryland


Date Argued: Tue Oct 29 2013
Case Number: 14-20450
Docket Number: 2591431
Judges:Barbara Milano Keenan, James A. Wynn Jr., Stephanie D. Thacker
Duration: 54 minutes
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Case Summary

**Case Summary: Jeffrey Gray v. Frederick County, Maryland** **Docket Number:** 2591431 **Court:** [Insert specific court name, if available, e.g., Circuit Court for Frederick County, Maryland] **Date:** [Insert relevant dates, if available] **Parties:** - **Plaintiff:** Jeffrey Gray - **Defendant:** Frederick County, Maryland **Background:** This case involves a legal dispute initiated by Jeffrey Gray against Frederick County, Maryland. The specifics of the dispute center around [insert a brief description of the nature of the case, e.g., issues related to municipal liability, civil rights violations, or other relevant legal matters]. **Legal Issues:** The case presents several legal issues including, but not limited to: - [Identify key legal issues, such as violations of constitutional rights, failure to uphold municipal policies, negligence, etc.] - [Additional legal claims or defenses raised by the parties.] **Facts:** - Jeffrey Gray filed a complaint against Frederick County, alleging [insert specific allegations made by the plaintiff]. - The county responded with [insert any specific responses, counterclaims, or defenses raised]. - Key facts relevant to the case include [summarize important facts that led to the legal dispute, such as incidents, actions taken, and any pertinent documentation or evidence]. **Court Rulings:** - [Outline any significant rulings made by the court during the course of the case, including motions to dismiss, summary judgment, or trial outcomes.] - [If applicable, include whether the court ruled in favor of the plaintiff or defendant and the rationale behind the decision.] **Conclusion:** The case of Jeffrey Gray v. Frederick County, Maryland raises important questions regarding [summarize the implications of the case in terms of law and policy]. The outcome of this case is expected to contribute to the understanding of [insert relevant legal principles or issues at stake]. **Next Steps:** - [Explain what the next steps in the legal process might be, such as appeals, settlement negotiations, or further proceedings.] **Note:** This summary is based on available information and may not include all aspects of the case. For a comprehensive understanding, further details from court documents and legal filings should be reviewed.

Jeffrey Gray v. Frederick County, Maryland


Oral Audio Transcript(Beta version)

The honorable, the judges of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. Oye, oye, oye, all persons having any manner to form a business for the honorable United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit are admonished to draw an eye and give their attention for the court is now sitting. God save the United States and this honorable court. Please be seated. Good morning, Judge Spacker, Judge Wynn and I are very pleased to welcome you to the Fourth Circuit. Our first case today is Jeffrey Gray versus Board of County Commissioners of Frederick County. Mr. Lightmer. Morning, our very good afternoon on behalf of the Appellants of this matter. Matter was, try before Jerry and the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland, at which time a verdict was rendered in favor of the defendants. We have a sign in particular three areas of error that precluded the plaintiffs in that case from receiving a fair trial. The first area, which is the jury instructions, but more importantly in this case, what we have put before this court is that the verdict was against the clear weight of the evidence and the judge should have granted a new trial. And the reason that we say that that is the most important area is because the jury in this case rendered a verdict against the plaintiffs based upon a tazering that occurred 23 seconds after an individual had been tazered, fell to the ground, lay motionless, did not speak, did not move. And at that time the officer tazered him again because in his view he still presented a threat because he didn't show his hand. And our position in that regard. Because his hands were concealed and he had been repeatedly non-compliant already. Wasn't it reasonable for the officer to assume he was continuing to be non-compliant? Well, in this, well, first of all, addressing that point, I don't think that the law has gotten to the point where we have said that failure to comply without more is the right card blanche to use force. I think that the Bostic case says that supreme court is not the question. And the question in terms of our review of this is the actions of a reasonable officer. In fact, a person, I guess, in theory could be unconscious. But the question really is, what are the perceptions of an officer under these circumstances and whether his actions are those of a reasonable officer under these circumstances? I agree. And that's where just that question is going not in terms of the, this is a horrible set of facts. I mean, it's really terrible. But when you focus on her question, what she is saying is the reasonable officer who, if he has the initial belief that he's putting his hands in the front of him, and he falls down, his hands are still in front of him. He's motionless, but his hands are still there

. And he doesn't comply. And he's already been non-compliant in process of it. Is there room for a jury to determine that a reasonable officer under the circumstances would think or could believe that there was a threat here? No. Because there has to be objective reason for this. This man had fallen down on the ground for 23 seconds. We're not talking about a rapidly evolving situation where this officer is under immense pressure. We're talking about 23 seconds. 23 seconds, this man lay, he didn't move, he didn't speak, he didn't try to get out, he didn't do anything. The officer, the only thing that the officer can relate to this gentleman even being alive was the fact that he coughed a couple of times. Other than that, he did nothing. There was back up on the way, and in fact the time records indicate that there was back up already on the scene. Right, but this officer said that he was not aware. Officer Torres was not aware that the other officer was on the scene. Now that was a matter for the jury to either accept or reject. I agree with you. He did say that, he did say that he wasn't aware that those officers were there, but he wasn't aware that there was back up coming. There was, again, if we were talking about extra circumstances, maybe we'd have a different perspective. Well, what about the fact there were two other people, two other defendants on the ground? How does that factor into the analysis in terms of why it wasn't that this is so different, for example, than the facts in the Myers case, which I know you're familiar with. Yes. In this case, there were three people involved in a fight at five o'clock in the morning when the officer responded to the scene. Two of them got on the ground. He didn't know that those two were going to stay on the ground, and he had someone who the third person, Mr. Gray, who had refused to show his hands. So why wasn't that a more volatile situation than what you're telling us today? The situation, the officer assesses it, and he made a determination that in his view, he needed to take action before back up got there. That's a decision that he's made. We're not arguing about that

. But what we're saying is that in that 23 seconds, nothing had happened. Here, according to the officer, those other two individuals were complaining. They didn't do anything. He did not have to do anything and acknowledge you, Your Honor. If he had used his firearm and shot an individual who was failing to show his hands, and that individual had fallen to the ground. And he told that individual, not knowing whether that individual was still alive or conscious or not, he told that individual to show his hands. That individual didn't show his hands. He walked over to that individual and then shot him in the back because that individual didn't show his hands. We would not have a question that that would be an inappropriate use of force. The situation doesn't change just because it's a taser. If an officer had punched a man in the jaw and the man fell down face first and the man did not move, the man lay motionless, the man didn't do anything, we would not have a question if it were on about the use of force if that officer then went over and kicked that man in the face because he didn't show his hands. We're having an issue here because it's a taser. And the taser is still a use of force. And just because the reasonable officer, the reasonable officer that just is easily taken into account that he's not moving, he's falling face first, he hasn't spoken, he's unconscious. If you don't know whether he's unconscious or not and you take force against that individual, I don't believe there's any way that we as human beings could say that's an objectively reasonable use of force. In the jury heard, I presume all of these arguments that you're making now and they rendered their verdicts. So what's your standard of review now on how do you get beyond it? Well, I think that the reason and that is why we say that the jury instructions were not properly formulated to give to this jury. When the jury instructions did not differentiate between the fact that there was two separate uses of force. And even if that initial use of force when he came upon the scene, that officer, even if that was reasonable, as this court has indicated, it doesn't matter when you're looking at the second use of force. If the threat has been alleviated, you have to take into account what the facts and circumstances are at the time the second use of force is taken. This case is no different. There was an initial use of force which we're not debating about, even though we question, we're not debating that. The initial use of force and he comes upon the scene, he perceives there to be a threat. Okay. But that second use of force, when you've got a gentleman standing up arguing with you and your hands going to your pants, although I don't believe the law has evolved to this point where you are allowed to use force simply before non-compliance. But let's assume that that use of force was justifiable, objectively reasonable

. There is nothing that puts that second use of force into that category because once he's tased, there is nothing that the officer has identified, nothing that the appellees have identified in their arguments to this court. Now, one single fact that anybody could say that suggests a threat? Didn't the officer testify that he had seen people before, apparently rendered unconscious, who then got up again and insisted upon him? What he said was on questioning, cross-examination, was in response to a question, what you've seen fighters who have been punched and they fall in face first and that usually indicates that they've been knocked out. And he said, I've seen people who've fallen face first and they were not unconscious. That's a different point. What we're saying is, here a man has been hit with 50,000 votes of electricity, a 50,000 vote shot for five seconds. This man has fallen, this man has not moved. We're not talking about for a second or two. We're talking 23 seconds, almost half a minute. And you are standing there and this man does nothing. You know that there's backup. There is nothing to indicate or suggest that he had to take police action at that time. There is nothing to indicate or to suggest that anything, he had moved location if he had moved his location just in case there was something that he had missed and the man was armed because he did see him when he drove up. He did not identify a shiny object. He did not identify a bold. He saw the man supposedly engaged and fighting with his friend. He did not identify anything that would suggest that he was armed before he fell. But just in case he was armed because his hands were there, he said that he changed locations so that he wouldn't know where he was so that if he was armed, he would not have a shot at him. And we're not challenging that. Those are all reasonable things. That's so said that he observed a bulge in Grace Pants where his hands were and he could not tell whether the bulge was called solely by his hands or by a concealed weapon. That's correct. And that was before he tased him the first time. That was before he tased him the first time. And that's why I said to your honest, we're not going to quibble about the first tasing because before the hands go in, he doesn't see a bulge. He sees a bulge when the hands go in and he says he doesn't know what that is. But the point of the matter is he's not standing

. He's not prone at that point after he stays. He's on the ground. He's not moving. And as the officer testified, those pros are still in his chest. And he still has the opportunity by simply pulling that trigger to send another 50,000 votes into this man who has not moved for 23 seconds. And so based upon all of the facts, the totality of the circumstances is what I'm saying. When you look at that, there was nothing objectively reasonable about this. And then when you take into account, we specifically asked the trial court to instruct the jury. For even that part, you are referencing the trial judge's excessive force instruction. Was deficient for the trial. Yeah, instruction 23, which was the only instruction that he gave with respect to the excessive force. It was deficient because, but two things. Number one, it did not adequately set forth the law. And number two, it did not distinguish between the fact that there were two uses of force. Okay, but you're not saying that 23 contained an incorrect statement of law. Are you? I do not. And I think. And being under a plane error standard of review, how do we reach your point when there's nothing incorrect about 23? And you didn't object to it on that? Well, we did object to it. Where did you object to it? What we said was, and I think that we said it for what we said was that 23, in and of itself, was an innocuous instruction. We're not saying that 23 was wrong. What we did was we said that 23 was insufficient. And we tried, we gave the judge three instructions. In fact, that we believe would have cured the deficiency in 23. Where did you say the instruction was deficient? You've got some language on page 10 and 11, and you're breathing. But that, that language is dealing with the immunity. No, you're not on

. About immunity. On pages three and four of our reply, we discuss three, four and five of the reply brief. We fully go through exactly why we, how we set forth that instruction 23 was deficient. We set forth the reasons why we believe that our instructions that we had proposed would have cured that problem. And you proposed your instructions on December 19th and the court's jury charge wasn't until January 24th. So how could your instructions have been in response to the court's proposed jury charge when you submitted them a month before that conference even occurred? Well, we submitted them pursuant to the court's order. We submitted the instructions and then we have a charge, a charge conference. And then when the judge presents us with what he proposed to give as instructions. And then we argue to the court. Right. So where's that objection on the record? Do you want to append it to 924? And there we say in this case, we have evidence that an individual was on the ground and not moving and not speaking. And so the issue of a threat comes about and I think it was clear the force used must be clear to your recent objective. And that regard a person who was unable to comply, this would not encompass that individual just the first sentence. So there is where we're talking about why we believe that jury instruction was deficient. And what instruction should have been given in order to at least cure that because clearly? But you were asking for some language that didn't track the facts of the case. Well, you're saying there the following language should be added. It was clearly established at the time of the incident that an individual who poses no threat. And that was the issue whether there was a threat. The fact that he still had his hands in his pants. So to have asked for an instruction that says there is no threat was really taking that issue away from the jury. Well, no, because if the jury concluded that there was no threat, then that instruction would be appropriate. If the jury included, if the jury concluded that there was a threat, then it would not. But we were asking the court because I think that that's the law. If there is no threat, then you don't have the right to use force. Right, but you weren't you weren't couching it in terms of if there on page 924. You asked the court to add to the instruction

. It was also clearly established that tasing an individual who. Excuse me, that at the time of the incident, giving rise to this lawsuit that tasing an individual who poses no threat constitutes excessive force. But what we had asked the court to give was it is excessive force for police officer, strike a person who was not resisting, who is not attempting to flee and who does not pose an immediate threat to the safety of the officer or others. That's what we asked the court to get. You're also talking about jury instruction number 30 there. According to page 923, that's the jury instruction you're talking about. Where the language we were asking the court to add that language since he was not. He was not willing to give the instructions that we posed. We were asking him to at least add that language. You're right. So what we were we asked the court to give the instruction that we thought should have been given. Right, but that's not the same as saying that. Number 23. Is incorrect and see when you have a plain error standard here. You've got to show that something that there was a. Substantial and injurious effect on your client due to a failure to properly instruct the jury. I think that. If you give an instruction that is a correct statement of the law, but it does not sufficiently address the issues in the case that would be the same. I think as as Judge Wynn noted in a concurring opinion in no V artson that so long as the charge is accurate on the law and does not confuse or mislead the jury, it is erroneous. The simple this simple inquiry is the heart of our review on an instruction appeal. And so when you look at what Judge Wynn said in no V artson, the point here is that it did mislead the jury. It did mislead them because it did not articulate and set forth before that jury clearly. That we're talking about two separate instances, two uses of force and even if force is justified at the time of the initial use of force, it could not be justified even seconds later if that force. But what you did in this case was really remarkable in the first instance. To get this case beyond the summary judgment and actually before a jury, any plaintiff's lawyers just start salivating if they can do that. So you got it before the jury, but the unfortunate thing is when the jury was presented with this divergent set of facts and everything you say is very reasonable

. It very well could have gone that way, but they chose to go the other way. But whatever reason, there have been officers credibility, there have been in a number of things. But what we are now called upon is to look at the law at this. And that's just what happens in a trial like this. I mean, as I said, the trial didn't do this thing pre-trial. In these cases, they never get before the jury because they lost them. Summary judgment or the issues aren't there, the evidence is all one way. You got this thing to the jury. That's powerful thing. The problem is once it gets to the jury there, then you don't know what a jury will come up with. If you're giving them actually two choices. So to prevail here, you now have to say there's nothing here to support that other side. But you do have him with his hands and his pants. And even though he's down on the ground, it's very bad set of facts. The question is, could the jury, for the reasonable jury determined that under these circumstances an officer in this position, the reason believe the threat was still there? I don't believe that a reasonable jury that had been correctly charged could have because you have to and I don't minimize the fact that these cases don't routinely get to juries. I don't minimize that and I agree with the court that this is not the norm. But in this case, the fact that we're there should not be the goal. The fact that we receive a level playing field once we get there is what we're asking for. If we had a level playing field, if we have the law is there, we're not asking you to make new law. We're simply asking this court to apply the law that is there, which is you cannot use force if that threat is eliminated. And if somebody who's on the ground not moving, speechless, motionless doesn't do anything to call into question a threat, then you don't get to use force just to see. And I think the analogy is provided with respect. I don't want to interrupt you, sir, but I just want to make sure you know you're using your rebuttal. I do. And unless there's another question, I'll stop at this point. Okay, sir

. Thank you. Ms. Lee. Sandra Lee representing Appellee. Your honours, you've raised a number of relevant questions. The issue in this matter, of course, on the excessive force claim of plaintiff is whether the use of force was reasonable under the circumstances. In order to determine whether the use of force was reasonable, in this case, the use of force according to the second amended complaint and plaintiff's argument were the two uses of the taser. The determination is whether the nature and quality of the intrusion on the, the Seed and the Fourth Amendment interests are weighed against the counter-vailing governmental interests indicate that the use of force was unreasonable. In order to establish that use of force was unreasonable, plaintiff had the burden of showing that plaintiff had the burden of proof. Well, isn't the bottom line of your case this was a jury question? Of course. You're on it. There were disputes of fact throughout the trial. Okay. And Mr. Latimer has, I mean, he makes a very compelling point when he says somebody lying on the ground for 23 seconds. I mean, that's an eternity at five in the morning. So it seems to me that you frame your jury question on the entire scene rather than this 22nd interval, 23 second interval. And, you know, really, I don't know that there's that much more that you're saying other than the fact that it's a jury question is there, except for the the jury instruction? You're on the jury, the issue that has been presented by plaintiff is whether there was sufficient evidence for the jury to render the verdict that it did. And in particular, with regard to the second tasing, Council has argued before this court, as he argued at trial, that the second tasing was not, second use of the tasing was not reasonable because the the scene was on the ground and was not moving. You know, on this, this was a horrible tragic result. So in the indication that there was a threat to the office that was when he first arrived. And you got two individuals currently fighting. He's called because they're fighting. I take it. No one has said anything about a gun. No one

. Directed. No weapon or anything of that sort. It is correct that there is no, there was no report of a weapon. What the officer knew when he arrived at the scene was that there were 9-1-1 calls for a fight among two or three males. When he arrived, he observed two males, the decedent Jeffrey Gray, and one of the trial witnesses, Mr. Duval, what he called actively fighting. But no indication that either one of them, you would think you're fighting and you had a gun on you, you probably would bring that gun out, and that would end that fight, or at least it would cause the person you fighting to not do anything. But none of that happened. None of that happened. One might indeed speculate that, I mean, it doesn't all kind of look when you look at it and I'm getting my mind around the whole business of the reasonable officer, but it is a situation that is created by the presence of the officer that he didn't feel so threatened. The officer was responding to a call for service. It was his job to respond to the call for service. When he observed the individuals fighting, it was his job to secure the safety of those individuals and of the people from each other or from the neighbors or from whom. What was he secured? The individuals who have seen to be fighting amongst themselves, and not fighting the neighbors, hadn't heard anybody say they were threatened by it or nobody else had just fighting among the cells. What is he secured? In your example, Your Honor, you pos it that had one of the individuals been carrying a weapon that individual might have pulled it out and used it. Clearly, if an individual, one of the individuals was fighting, was armed, was carrying a weapon and had not yet used it, if the fight was to continue with the officer just standing back and watching or using only the minimal level of force of the verbal commands, which he did use. I'm trying to understand in terms of carrying a weapon and I understand people can carry them up front, but normally it would seem to me that someone who's in a fight, if you got a weapon in your pants, I mean, you think it ought to be in a host or something, I mean it can't just be sitting inside of your pants while you're fighting, but would it? Had you, Your Honor, been on the jury, you might have presented that. But I want to know the evidence in terms of, because there seem to be some indication that it is, you know, people have guns in front of and I mean, we can kind of use common sense. So yeah, you can carry a gun as a good place to put it. But I'm, is it reasonable for a person who's involved in some type of a serious fight to have a gun in front of them the whole time they're fighting and I'm trying to picture this. Now, is he wearing those kind of pants that young guys all wear it as halfway down his whatever there? I don't know. I mean, those are the things that be salient. Facts to me, at least when I'm thinking about it and I'm not saying it's not a jury question, I don't know if it was presented in this light, but it, but all of those things come together when you're thinking about, well, the officer is threatened. And if he's in this kind of a neighborhood or he's been here in this situation, he knows this person could be having a gun. But if, but if the nature of it is an active fight, but he's going after it, I don't know how they're fighting. That's, that doesn't seem to be described

. It would be relevant to me how they're fighting. They're pulling on each other and falling on the ground and he's got a gun in front of him. And I mean, I'm trying to figure that one out. It makes sense if you walk up on someone and they're just standing there and he puts his hand down in front of me. He's holding it. But someone who's been fighting, he's going to have a gun. Judge, when that, if I'm, if I might address the, please, but the facts and circumstances before the officer at each of the officer's actions, when he arrived, he observed men fighting that as a crime. As the officer testified, he observed the crimes of disorderly conduct, which while a minor crime does. Why? I'm going to tell him that he has a duty, has a duty to do something. He sees something wrong and he's going to take an action where I'm, when I'm trying to go to is a question of the reasonable threat that arises because he has, it seems to focus on the fact he's got those hands in front of him. And that would indicate a threat because he could have a gun. I mean, if he's got his hands in front of him and nothing there, there's no threat. I mean, you can put your hands in front of you. It's not a threat for you, I wouldn't think, but he's got to have something, or some believe something is there. Your officer, what the jury heard on that subject was that after the officer had arrived and given the commands to throw the hands and get down on the ground, the two of the individuals, one individual complied, that's Mr. Cajiga, two of the individuals cursed him, said they were not doing anything. The officer then deployed, as Taser means, pulled it out as he explained, that deployed a Taser means, and said again, gave the commands lie down and show me your hands, get down on the ground and show me your hands, or you'll be tased. One of the individuals, Mr. Duval, got down on the ground and showed his hands. The other individual, and this was the use, this was the threat that the officer testified he perceived. One of the other individual, Mr. Gray, turned his back on the officer and his hands, that point had been out of his waistband, put his hand into the waistband of his pants. I have not observed the pants, but apparently they were of the variety that had a loose enough waistband that the hands could go into the waistband. It's not in evidence, but the officer has also was not sure that if it was in his pockets, it's not in the record. And he would not take his hands out. And he would not take his hands out. Tell me this, had he taken them out, would that have been a cause to then shoot it, because you don't know what he pulled, who's pulling out? Seems like that's really when the threat occurs. That is not while his hands is in his pants, it's when it comes out of his pants. I respect that. So he's in a loose, loose situation when he turns around, puts his hands in his pants, even if he pulls those, even more so, he pulls that hand out of that pants at that time. That would really seem to be strong evidence. There's a potential threat, because he didn't, he can't see that. Those were not, those were not the circumstances that face the other side. But I'm sure, I'm sure. None of these circumstances, if we accept where this is going, these facts indicate that once he turned around, put his hands, I think of any, because once we write this kind of thing, we're going to have to zero in on that fact that his hands is maybe concealed in a spot. Then that's, there had been front could be in a coat pocket, could be in the side. And you don't know what's in there. And long as it's in there, probably there's not a threat as long as it's there, because he's turned around with it down. The problem occurs if he pulls it out. It would seem that's a threat. But as long as he's turned around with his back turned that way, he's simply disobeying the orders and not, not agreeing, but, but where's the threat? I point out, Your Honor, that, that the taser, when it was, when it was used, struck Mr. Torres in the chest, so he had turned toward the officer before the officer used the taser. For matters of this sort regarding how fast or whether a weapon can be used from within the pants of Your Honor, by his hands out of his pants. He did not. Or at least he was not afraid. As long as his hands were in the pants, and out of him to use a gun, he'd put his hands down there and then take the gun and pull it up in his pants. A threat would happen when he would take it out. Judge Win, I respectfully disagree that there was no threat until he removed his hands from the pants. Besides which, first, well, first, the expert testimony in this case was defense expert Thomas was a use of force expert qualified as an expert who testified that when a person puts his hands in his pants, it is a threat. It constitutes a threat. And what makes it a threat? Because he may use a weapon. He may have his hands

. Tell me this, had he taken them out, would that have been a cause to then shoot it, because you don't know what he pulled, who's pulling out? Seems like that's really when the threat occurs. That is not while his hands is in his pants, it's when it comes out of his pants. I respect that. So he's in a loose, loose situation when he turns around, puts his hands in his pants, even if he pulls those, even more so, he pulls that hand out of that pants at that time. That would really seem to be strong evidence. There's a potential threat, because he didn't, he can't see that. Those were not, those were not the circumstances that face the other side. But I'm sure, I'm sure. None of these circumstances, if we accept where this is going, these facts indicate that once he turned around, put his hands, I think of any, because once we write this kind of thing, we're going to have to zero in on that fact that his hands is maybe concealed in a spot. Then that's, there had been front could be in a coat pocket, could be in the side. And you don't know what's in there. And long as it's in there, probably there's not a threat as long as it's there, because he's turned around with it down. The problem occurs if he pulls it out. It would seem that's a threat. But as long as he's turned around with his back turned that way, he's simply disobeying the orders and not, not agreeing, but, but where's the threat? I point out, Your Honor, that, that the taser, when it was, when it was used, struck Mr. Torres in the chest, so he had turned toward the officer before the officer used the taser. For matters of this sort regarding how fast or whether a weapon can be used from within the pants of Your Honor, by his hands out of his pants. He did not. Or at least he was not afraid. As long as his hands were in the pants, and out of him to use a gun, he'd put his hands down there and then take the gun and pull it up in his pants. A threat would happen when he would take it out. Judge Win, I respectfully disagree that there was no threat until he removed his hands from the pants. Besides which, first, well, first, the expert testimony in this case was defense expert Thomas was a use of force expert qualified as an expert who testified that when a person puts his hands in his pants, it is a threat. It constitutes a threat. And what makes it a threat? Because he may use a weapon. He may have his hands. Inside his pants. Absolutely. While his hands are down inside his pants. Absolutely. If, if, and that's a common occurrence, someone puts their hands down in, do not pull them out, but they shoot through their pants. I guess is what you're saying. Your Honor, the question is not whether it is a common occurrence. The question is, those questions are the questions. The question is whether or not there's a threat. Whether it poses a threat. Yes. And the expert testimony, which the jury was entitled to believe, was that the putting of the placement of the hands in pants, the officer had been taught in and of itself is a threat. Well, let me move to the next. No, I want to understand that fact. I want to understand this fact of the hands in the pants. Because I don't know where they go. I understand the total, the circumstance was going on, but it was zero in that the threat here is the hands in the pants. And your expert says the mere fact. Is that what he's saying? The mere fact hands in pants is a threat. Nothing more. Yes. Your Honor, have you read testimony from police officers who testify about how fast a weapon can be used? It is a matter of a second or less for a hand to come out of the pants with a hand on the trigger. Are you quoting the record now or is this you? This is not in this. This is not in this. Why don't you stick to the record then? Well, certainly well, Judge Kenan. Does it matter whether or not he has a taser or whether he has a gun the officer? Would he have been just equally justified to a shot him with a gun? Under these circumstances

. Inside his pants. Absolutely. While his hands are down inside his pants. Absolutely. If, if, and that's a common occurrence, someone puts their hands down in, do not pull them out, but they shoot through their pants. I guess is what you're saying. Your Honor, the question is not whether it is a common occurrence. The question is, those questions are the questions. The question is whether or not there's a threat. Whether it poses a threat. Yes. And the expert testimony, which the jury was entitled to believe, was that the putting of the placement of the hands in pants, the officer had been taught in and of itself is a threat. Well, let me move to the next. No, I want to understand that fact. I want to understand this fact of the hands in the pants. Because I don't know where they go. I understand the total, the circumstance was going on, but it was zero in that the threat here is the hands in the pants. And your expert says the mere fact. Is that what he's saying? The mere fact hands in pants is a threat. Nothing more. Yes. Your Honor, have you read testimony from police officers who testify about how fast a weapon can be used? It is a matter of a second or less for a hand to come out of the pants with a hand on the trigger. Are you quoting the record now or is this you? This is not in this. This is not in this. Why don't you stick to the record then? Well, certainly well, Judge Kenan. Does it matter whether or not he has a taser or whether he has a gun the officer? Would he have been just equally justified to a shot him with a gun? Under these circumstances. First, of course, I must say he did not do so. Oh, I understand that. But if we write it in this way and because the standard is reasonable officer and it seems that it's not the level of force, it's the threat that he's having at time. So it does not, does it matter? If he'd put out his gun and had it on him and shot him for having his hands in his pants. Now if we're taking him out, just having his hands in his pants. And you say an expert said that's enough. That is a threat of, according to the testimony that the jury heard, that was a, the officer was presented with a threat of deadly physical force. So you're saying serious, just by shooting him. And under the law, a threat of serious physical injury or deadly force or death. Does justify the use of deadly force. Deadly force was not used in this case. The officer had no reason to believe that the force that he was using would culminate in the tragic death of Mr. Gray. Moreover, I point out that there was evidence that there was no causal connection between the use of the taser and the death of Mr. Gray and that the jury found as a matter of fact that the officer's acts did not cause the death of Mr. Gray. We may or may not agree with the jury, but that was the jury's finding of fact. And it was supported by the medical examiner's testimony, expert testimony, which is required for matters like this that are beyond the can of the average lay juror, that there was a temporal connection, which is merely repeating the obvious that obviously the man died after he had had the taser used against him, but that there was not any evidence of a causal connection between the use of the taser and Mr. Gray's tragic death. Your Honor, the... How hard are they saying he died? I think if I can... What was the reason why he died? What was the evidence that

. First, of course, I must say he did not do so. Oh, I understand that. But if we write it in this way and because the standard is reasonable officer and it seems that it's not the level of force, it's the threat that he's having at time. So it does not, does it matter? If he'd put out his gun and had it on him and shot him for having his hands in his pants. Now if we're taking him out, just having his hands in his pants. And you say an expert said that's enough. That is a threat of, according to the testimony that the jury heard, that was a, the officer was presented with a threat of deadly physical force. So you're saying serious, just by shooting him. And under the law, a threat of serious physical injury or deadly force or death. Does justify the use of deadly force. Deadly force was not used in this case. The officer had no reason to believe that the force that he was using would culminate in the tragic death of Mr. Gray. Moreover, I point out that there was evidence that there was no causal connection between the use of the taser and the death of Mr. Gray and that the jury found as a matter of fact that the officer's acts did not cause the death of Mr. Gray. We may or may not agree with the jury, but that was the jury's finding of fact. And it was supported by the medical examiner's testimony, expert testimony, which is required for matters like this that are beyond the can of the average lay juror, that there was a temporal connection, which is merely repeating the obvious that obviously the man died after he had had the taser used against him, but that there was not any evidence of a causal connection between the use of the taser and Mr. Gray's tragic death. Your Honor, the... How hard are they saying he died? I think if I can... What was the reason why he died? What was the evidence that... Health, hole intoxication and restraint. Oh, wait a minute, there was something else. Then the tasering... They're saying there was nothing about the fact that the lodging of one of the probes near his heart caused cardiac arrhythmia, nothing at all in this record. There is nothing in the medical examiner's testimony, expert testimony. He was the only medical expert who was the testified at trial that supports a conclusion that the tasering, the use of the taser near the heart resulted in caused the death of Mr. Gray. Other cases in other matters, there has been... The official calls of death was listed as undetermined. Is that right? Yes, Your Honor. Yes, but that is correct. So that's different. I don't know where we go where you... That last part you're just going to... I find it hard to believe it's not ACALs. I'm not saying Z-CALs, but it could be ACALs and that's really all you need is a connective in terms of proximate cause of it

... Health, hole intoxication and restraint. Oh, wait a minute, there was something else. Then the tasering... They're saying there was nothing about the fact that the lodging of one of the probes near his heart caused cardiac arrhythmia, nothing at all in this record. There is nothing in the medical examiner's testimony, expert testimony. He was the only medical expert who was the testified at trial that supports a conclusion that the tasering, the use of the taser near the heart resulted in caused the death of Mr. Gray. Other cases in other matters, there has been... The official calls of death was listed as undetermined. Is that right? Yes, Your Honor. Yes, but that is correct. So that's different. I don't know where we go where you... That last part you're just going to... I find it hard to believe it's not ACALs. I'm not saying Z-CALs, but it could be ACALs and that's really all you need is a connective in terms of proximate cause of it. But the question here deals with this excessive force and there is some indication that the appellant didn't object yet, the Augustriniolously, he objected to this instruction and points to the record these points and how do you respond to that? In the Fox, what kind of review should be here? If you read the... As we argued in our brief, Your Honor, if you read the charging conference, there was no objection made to instruction 23, which was the excessive force. Instruction, nor was there any request that it be supplemented at that time. And was that actually instruction 24 during the... It was, yes, Your Honor, because during instruction 8, I believe, regarded inner agitories, and there had not been any inner agitories presented. So there was during instruction, proposed during instruction 8 was removed. Thus, the discussion that Council referred to during instruction, regarded during instruction 30, which was the qualified immunity instruction, I'm sorry, proposed instruction 30, which turned out to be instruction 29, which was given to the jury. The issue with regard to the qualified immunity, of course, was whether it was clearly established that the use of force was unconstitutional. Your Honor, the jury's verdict was not irreconcilably inconsistent in this case. The jury found that there was a use of force, the tasering, that it was objectively reasonable. The jury was instructed properly in jury instruction 23, that the standard was whether a reasonable officer could have believed that the use of force was necessary because of the Graham standards of whether a crime had been committed and how serious the crime was, in this case, Judge Wynn has pointed out that the only crime was a assault with hands and no use of weapon, nonetheless, there was a crime, and whether there was a threat, the officer's testimony, along with the testimony of the defendant's expert, Mr. Thomas, was accepted by the jury that there was a threat, that the officer's use of force and assault of Mr. Gray was a privileged use of force, that he was entitled to the defense of defending himself or others. The jury's verdict was actually completely consistent in that it found a use of force and found that the use of force was privileged with regard to the state cranks claims and reasonable with regard to the federal 1983 claim. Your Honor, the case cited by both parties, Noel V. Artsen, I believe, is dispositive as to the issue whether the jury was required to receive instructions marshalling the evidence and commenting on the evidence. It was not, it was properly instructed, the discretion of the district court was properly exercised and I- Did the deputy call the EMS in between the TAsian? Yes, Your Honor. In the 23 seconds between the- It is standard operating procedure, police procedure, in every jurisdiction in which I've practiced that the use of a taser or the other use of force, but specifically the use of a taser, is grounds to call for medical response. So what happened in the 23- God bless or what happens once you- Absolutely. Actually, actually use it you then call the EMS. Yes, and- Because a taser can be a lethal weapon. No, Your Honor, I respectfully submit that that is not the reason that the EMS is called

. But the question here deals with this excessive force and there is some indication that the appellant didn't object yet, the Augustriniolously, he objected to this instruction and points to the record these points and how do you respond to that? In the Fox, what kind of review should be here? If you read the... As we argued in our brief, Your Honor, if you read the charging conference, there was no objection made to instruction 23, which was the excessive force. Instruction, nor was there any request that it be supplemented at that time. And was that actually instruction 24 during the... It was, yes, Your Honor, because during instruction 8, I believe, regarded inner agitories, and there had not been any inner agitories presented. So there was during instruction, proposed during instruction 8 was removed. Thus, the discussion that Council referred to during instruction, regarded during instruction 30, which was the qualified immunity instruction, I'm sorry, proposed instruction 30, which turned out to be instruction 29, which was given to the jury. The issue with regard to the qualified immunity, of course, was whether it was clearly established that the use of force was unconstitutional. Your Honor, the jury's verdict was not irreconcilably inconsistent in this case. The jury found that there was a use of force, the tasering, that it was objectively reasonable. The jury was instructed properly in jury instruction 23, that the standard was whether a reasonable officer could have believed that the use of force was necessary because of the Graham standards of whether a crime had been committed and how serious the crime was, in this case, Judge Wynn has pointed out that the only crime was a assault with hands and no use of weapon, nonetheless, there was a crime, and whether there was a threat, the officer's testimony, along with the testimony of the defendant's expert, Mr. Thomas, was accepted by the jury that there was a threat, that the officer's use of force and assault of Mr. Gray was a privileged use of force, that he was entitled to the defense of defending himself or others. The jury's verdict was actually completely consistent in that it found a use of force and found that the use of force was privileged with regard to the state cranks claims and reasonable with regard to the federal 1983 claim. Your Honor, the case cited by both parties, Noel V. Artsen, I believe, is dispositive as to the issue whether the jury was required to receive instructions marshalling the evidence and commenting on the evidence. It was not, it was properly instructed, the discretion of the district court was properly exercised and I- Did the deputy call the EMS in between the TAsian? Yes, Your Honor. In the 23 seconds between the- It is standard operating procedure, police procedure, in every jurisdiction in which I've practiced that the use of a taser or the other use of force, but specifically the use of a taser, is grounds to call for medical response. So what happened in the 23- God bless or what happens once you- Absolutely. Actually, actually use it you then call the EMS. Yes, and- Because a taser can be a lethal weapon. No, Your Honor, I respectfully submit that that is not the reason that the EMS is called. It is clearly a disruptive use of force on an individual and individual as this court may have encountered in other cases an individual. Falls may hurt himself, so in that 23 seconds between the beginning of the first tasering, first five seconds went on during which the first taser was used. So they all were down to what's 23- My 18 seconds- When he fell, did he fall, he fell first face- He fell on- He fell on- On the front, on the front, on the back. And he down facing at that time the ground- Yes, Your Honor, and his hands are still down inside of his pants. Your Honor, the officer was not able to testify, stated that his hands were beneath him Because his elbows were up, it might be reasonable to conclude that his hands had left his waist- But he's not moving. He hasn't made it- You know, we talked about this business that he wasn't pulling the hands out while he was standing, but now he's down on the ground and there is a threat that he's going to be able to pull out face down to the ground, a gun turned around and shoot him. Your Honor, you would not have to turn around. He had fallen to the ground, his hands were beneath him. Had- had- It was not there- The officer could not tell whether his hands were still in his waistband, where, by the way, he'd also seen a bulge which he did not know was whether it was a weapon or not. And if his- If he was holding a weapon, he certainly could have fired at the officer. And the officer's response of moving from where he had originally been and calling EMS were both responses that he was trained to do after the use of a taser- Did he move to the side or move behind it? He moved to the side, he moved in and in part so that he would not be in the same location relative to Mr. Gray. Respectfully, Your Honor, that is completely consistent with the officer's testified subjective concern that the weapon would be used against him. Thank you, Your Honor. Thank you, Miss Lee. Mr. Lightimer. I think just based upon what they've just said, that there could not have been a threat to this officer, as Judge Wynn has talked about, his hands, according to the officer, are in his pants. There's no threat then. The expert didn't testify that the threat arises when your hands go into your waistband, what the expert testified was that a weapon- If there is anything about the jury instructions in this case that would have prevented you from arguing to the jury what you're arguing to us now. We were not- I mean in all candid, we were not prevented by the trial court in our arguments. The trial court did not- Did you argue that? Did you argue that to the jury? That's what we just discussed. And in other words, the threat does not arise from being hands- but it arises by the possibility or the chance that he could be pulling out a gun and using it. Was that the nature of your argument? That there was no threat because his hands actually stayed in his pants the whole time. And more so when he fell down first, a face forward on the ground, that threat, if it had existed standing up, had to be diminished because he was down on the ground this time. Did you argue that? I believe we did

. It is clearly a disruptive use of force on an individual and individual as this court may have encountered in other cases an individual. Falls may hurt himself, so in that 23 seconds between the beginning of the first tasering, first five seconds went on during which the first taser was used. So they all were down to what's 23- My 18 seconds- When he fell, did he fall, he fell first face- He fell on- He fell on- On the front, on the front, on the back. And he down facing at that time the ground- Yes, Your Honor, and his hands are still down inside of his pants. Your Honor, the officer was not able to testify, stated that his hands were beneath him Because his elbows were up, it might be reasonable to conclude that his hands had left his waist- But he's not moving. He hasn't made it- You know, we talked about this business that he wasn't pulling the hands out while he was standing, but now he's down on the ground and there is a threat that he's going to be able to pull out face down to the ground, a gun turned around and shoot him. Your Honor, you would not have to turn around. He had fallen to the ground, his hands were beneath him. Had- had- It was not there- The officer could not tell whether his hands were still in his waistband, where, by the way, he'd also seen a bulge which he did not know was whether it was a weapon or not. And if his- If he was holding a weapon, he certainly could have fired at the officer. And the officer's response of moving from where he had originally been and calling EMS were both responses that he was trained to do after the use of a taser- Did he move to the side or move behind it? He moved to the side, he moved in and in part so that he would not be in the same location relative to Mr. Gray. Respectfully, Your Honor, that is completely consistent with the officer's testified subjective concern that the weapon would be used against him. Thank you, Your Honor. Thank you, Miss Lee. Mr. Lightimer. I think just based upon what they've just said, that there could not have been a threat to this officer, as Judge Wynn has talked about, his hands, according to the officer, are in his pants. There's no threat then. The expert didn't testify that the threat arises when your hands go into your waistband, what the expert testified was that a weapon- If there is anything about the jury instructions in this case that would have prevented you from arguing to the jury what you're arguing to us now. We were not- I mean in all candid, we were not prevented by the trial court in our arguments. The trial court did not- Did you argue that? Did you argue that to the jury? That's what we just discussed. And in other words, the threat does not arise from being hands- but it arises by the possibility or the chance that he could be pulling out a gun and using it. Was that the nature of your argument? That there was no threat because his hands actually stayed in his pants the whole time. And more so when he fell down first, a face forward on the ground, that threat, if it had existed standing up, had to be diminished because he was down on the ground this time. Did you argue that? I believe we did. I believe we did. And the other side argued differently. So that there end is where just that is going is that's a jury question. If the jury chooses not to believe one or the other, we are caught a blow here. So what makes us be able to pick and choose which facts we think are more reasonable? Well, I don't think that I'm asking- And I must say it does sound quite reasonable. That it is hard to believe there's a threat. It's obvious but it's not beyond the province of evidence that a jury could come to that conclusion, is it? Well, I do. I do. It is because you cannot just say that something is a threat because somebody says it's a threat. There has to be some objective reason for this. And what we're saying is no reasonable jury could have- No reasonable jury that had been properly charged could have concluded that was a threat. What is the threat? We have asked this question repeatedly in our papers. We have put the gauntlet to them to tell this court what is the threat? The only threat that the officer says was that he didn't move his hand. But the threat is not in your pants. The threat is what you bring out your pants. You don't- The officer had moved. He testified. He had moved. Therefore, the officer who was standing in front of him and tased him was no longer standing in front of him and tased him. So this guy would have had to pull a weapon, turn, find the officer, and then use this weapon supposedly that he has. While he has two pens in him that are capable of sending 50,000 votes and officers holding a trigger to that, officers are arriving on the scene. The officer had no need to take immediate action. There was no threat. And we go back to the jury. I mean, I think that the trial judge had it right the first time when he said that the jury's decision wasn't really a decision at all. I mean, we've got a verdict for him that comes back

. I believe we did. And the other side argued differently. So that there end is where just that is going is that's a jury question. If the jury chooses not to believe one or the other, we are caught a blow here. So what makes us be able to pick and choose which facts we think are more reasonable? Well, I don't think that I'm asking- And I must say it does sound quite reasonable. That it is hard to believe there's a threat. It's obvious but it's not beyond the province of evidence that a jury could come to that conclusion, is it? Well, I do. I do. It is because you cannot just say that something is a threat because somebody says it's a threat. There has to be some objective reason for this. And what we're saying is no reasonable jury could have- No reasonable jury that had been properly charged could have concluded that was a threat. What is the threat? We have asked this question repeatedly in our papers. We have put the gauntlet to them to tell this court what is the threat? The only threat that the officer says was that he didn't move his hand. But the threat is not in your pants. The threat is what you bring out your pants. You don't- The officer had moved. He testified. He had moved. Therefore, the officer who was standing in front of him and tased him was no longer standing in front of him and tased him. So this guy would have had to pull a weapon, turn, find the officer, and then use this weapon supposedly that he has. While he has two pens in him that are capable of sending 50,000 votes and officers holding a trigger to that, officers are arriving on the scene. The officer had no need to take immediate action. There was no threat. And we go back to the jury. I mean, I think that the trial judge had it right the first time when he said that the jury's decision wasn't really a decision at all. I mean, we've got a verdict for him that comes back. You're supposed to reach a unanimous verdict and everybody and every question has written into it a consensus. And that was the jury called? The jury was called and they said that was our verdict. Yes, we reached a consensus. Or what does consensus mean? They argue that well, Webster's dictionary says that a consensus is a synonym of unanimous. However, the jury wasn't told that. The jury wasn't given a dictionary. The jury was told. Did you ask the court for further clarification of that? The court told us it was declaring a mistrial. We did not have an opportunity. We assumed that when the court told us it was going to declare a mistrial because the jury's verdict did not, they had not reached a verdict that that was what was going to happen. We were shot. We were totally shot when the judge accepted that verdict and excused the jury. The judge had told us prior to bringing that jury in to have them read that verdict that he was going to declare a mistrial. So we don't get the opportunity to do that. So when you talk about the jury's verdict, I mean, that is a major issue here. What is a consensus? The jury wasn't told what a consensus was. The jury did, yes, we all expect the jury's following instructions that they are given. That is what we're taught from day one. You're a litigator. That is what you believe. But when a jury comes back and every question has written consensus, consensus, we could not reach a consensus. How then does that mean that they have followed the instruction? It doesn't. They didn't. And when you say it's not irreconcilable, the jury indicated in this case there was an assault and battery, but then there was no excessive force. That's not consistent. That cannot be harmonized

. You're supposed to reach a unanimous verdict and everybody and every question has written into it a consensus. And that was the jury called? The jury was called and they said that was our verdict. Yes, we reached a consensus. Or what does consensus mean? They argue that well, Webster's dictionary says that a consensus is a synonym of unanimous. However, the jury wasn't told that. The jury wasn't given a dictionary. The jury was told. Did you ask the court for further clarification of that? The court told us it was declaring a mistrial. We did not have an opportunity. We assumed that when the court told us it was going to declare a mistrial because the jury's verdict did not, they had not reached a verdict that that was what was going to happen. We were shot. We were totally shot when the judge accepted that verdict and excused the jury. The judge had told us prior to bringing that jury in to have them read that verdict that he was going to declare a mistrial. So we don't get the opportunity to do that. So when you talk about the jury's verdict, I mean, that is a major issue here. What is a consensus? The jury wasn't told what a consensus was. The jury did, yes, we all expect the jury's following instructions that they are given. That is what we're taught from day one. You're a litigator. That is what you believe. But when a jury comes back and every question has written consensus, consensus, we could not reach a consensus. How then does that mean that they have followed the instruction? It doesn't. They didn't. And when you say it's not irreconcilable, the jury indicated in this case there was an assault and battery, but then there was no excessive force. That's not consistent. That cannot be harmonized. No way can that be harmonized. And when you have all of these things which come into account. Okay, Mr. Liedmer. I hate to interrupt you again, but that's the red light. That's right. Could you please just take one minute and wrap it up? I do. And I submit to you that there was no threat for the officer to, the significant threat that justified the officer using force after the first tasing. We submit to you that the jury instructions did not adequately set forth the law. And we submit to you that this verdict based upon what the jury said was a consensus was irreconcilably irreconcilable with what they issued. And for that reason, the trial court aired when it did not grant a new trial. And so we would ask that a new trial be granted in this case. Thank you, Your Honor. Thank you. Court will come down to greet Council and then we'll proceed to your next case.

The honorable, the judges of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. Oye, oye, oye, all persons having any manner to form a business for the honorable United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit are admonished to draw an eye and give their attention for the court is now sitting. God save the United States and this honorable court. Please be seated. Good morning, Judge Spacker, Judge Wynn and I are very pleased to welcome you to the Fourth Circuit. Our first case today is Jeffrey Gray versus Board of County Commissioners of Frederick County. Mr. Lightmer. Morning, our very good afternoon on behalf of the Appellants of this matter. Matter was, try before Jerry and the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland, at which time a verdict was rendered in favor of the defendants. We have a sign in particular three areas of error that precluded the plaintiffs in that case from receiving a fair trial. The first area, which is the jury instructions, but more importantly in this case, what we have put before this court is that the verdict was against the clear weight of the evidence and the judge should have granted a new trial. And the reason that we say that that is the most important area is because the jury in this case rendered a verdict against the plaintiffs based upon a tazering that occurred 23 seconds after an individual had been tazered, fell to the ground, lay motionless, did not speak, did not move. And at that time the officer tazered him again because in his view he still presented a threat because he didn't show his hand. And our position in that regard. Because his hands were concealed and he had been repeatedly non-compliant already. Wasn't it reasonable for the officer to assume he was continuing to be non-compliant? Well, in this, well, first of all, addressing that point, I don't think that the law has gotten to the point where we have said that failure to comply without more is the right card blanche to use force. I think that the Bostic case says that supreme court is not the question. And the question in terms of our review of this is the actions of a reasonable officer. In fact, a person, I guess, in theory could be unconscious. But the question really is, what are the perceptions of an officer under these circumstances and whether his actions are those of a reasonable officer under these circumstances? I agree. And that's where just that question is going not in terms of the, this is a horrible set of facts. I mean, it's really terrible. But when you focus on her question, what she is saying is the reasonable officer who, if he has the initial belief that he's putting his hands in the front of him, and he falls down, his hands are still in front of him. He's motionless, but his hands are still there. And he doesn't comply. And he's already been non-compliant in process of it. Is there room for a jury to determine that a reasonable officer under the circumstances would think or could believe that there was a threat here? No. Because there has to be objective reason for this. This man had fallen down on the ground for 23 seconds. We're not talking about a rapidly evolving situation where this officer is under immense pressure. We're talking about 23 seconds. 23 seconds, this man lay, he didn't move, he didn't speak, he didn't try to get out, he didn't do anything. The officer, the only thing that the officer can relate to this gentleman even being alive was the fact that he coughed a couple of times. Other than that, he did nothing. There was back up on the way, and in fact the time records indicate that there was back up already on the scene. Right, but this officer said that he was not aware. Officer Torres was not aware that the other officer was on the scene. Now that was a matter for the jury to either accept or reject. I agree with you. He did say that, he did say that he wasn't aware that those officers were there, but he wasn't aware that there was back up coming. There was, again, if we were talking about extra circumstances, maybe we'd have a different perspective. Well, what about the fact there were two other people, two other defendants on the ground? How does that factor into the analysis in terms of why it wasn't that this is so different, for example, than the facts in the Myers case, which I know you're familiar with. Yes. In this case, there were three people involved in a fight at five o'clock in the morning when the officer responded to the scene. Two of them got on the ground. He didn't know that those two were going to stay on the ground, and he had someone who the third person, Mr. Gray, who had refused to show his hands. So why wasn't that a more volatile situation than what you're telling us today? The situation, the officer assesses it, and he made a determination that in his view, he needed to take action before back up got there. That's a decision that he's made. We're not arguing about that. But what we're saying is that in that 23 seconds, nothing had happened. Here, according to the officer, those other two individuals were complaining. They didn't do anything. He did not have to do anything and acknowledge you, Your Honor. If he had used his firearm and shot an individual who was failing to show his hands, and that individual had fallen to the ground. And he told that individual, not knowing whether that individual was still alive or conscious or not, he told that individual to show his hands. That individual didn't show his hands. He walked over to that individual and then shot him in the back because that individual didn't show his hands. We would not have a question that that would be an inappropriate use of force. The situation doesn't change just because it's a taser. If an officer had punched a man in the jaw and the man fell down face first and the man did not move, the man lay motionless, the man didn't do anything, we would not have a question if it were on about the use of force if that officer then went over and kicked that man in the face because he didn't show his hands. We're having an issue here because it's a taser. And the taser is still a use of force. And just because the reasonable officer, the reasonable officer that just is easily taken into account that he's not moving, he's falling face first, he hasn't spoken, he's unconscious. If you don't know whether he's unconscious or not and you take force against that individual, I don't believe there's any way that we as human beings could say that's an objectively reasonable use of force. In the jury heard, I presume all of these arguments that you're making now and they rendered their verdicts. So what's your standard of review now on how do you get beyond it? Well, I think that the reason and that is why we say that the jury instructions were not properly formulated to give to this jury. When the jury instructions did not differentiate between the fact that there was two separate uses of force. And even if that initial use of force when he came upon the scene, that officer, even if that was reasonable, as this court has indicated, it doesn't matter when you're looking at the second use of force. If the threat has been alleviated, you have to take into account what the facts and circumstances are at the time the second use of force is taken. This case is no different. There was an initial use of force which we're not debating about, even though we question, we're not debating that. The initial use of force and he comes upon the scene, he perceives there to be a threat. Okay. But that second use of force, when you've got a gentleman standing up arguing with you and your hands going to your pants, although I don't believe the law has evolved to this point where you are allowed to use force simply before non-compliance. But let's assume that that use of force was justifiable, objectively reasonable. There is nothing that puts that second use of force into that category because once he's tased, there is nothing that the officer has identified, nothing that the appellees have identified in their arguments to this court. Now, one single fact that anybody could say that suggests a threat? Didn't the officer testify that he had seen people before, apparently rendered unconscious, who then got up again and insisted upon him? What he said was on questioning, cross-examination, was in response to a question, what you've seen fighters who have been punched and they fall in face first and that usually indicates that they've been knocked out. And he said, I've seen people who've fallen face first and they were not unconscious. That's a different point. What we're saying is, here a man has been hit with 50,000 votes of electricity, a 50,000 vote shot for five seconds. This man has fallen, this man has not moved. We're not talking about for a second or two. We're talking 23 seconds, almost half a minute. And you are standing there and this man does nothing. You know that there's backup. There is nothing to indicate or suggest that he had to take police action at that time. There is nothing to indicate or to suggest that anything, he had moved location if he had moved his location just in case there was something that he had missed and the man was armed because he did see him when he drove up. He did not identify a shiny object. He did not identify a bold. He saw the man supposedly engaged and fighting with his friend. He did not identify anything that would suggest that he was armed before he fell. But just in case he was armed because his hands were there, he said that he changed locations so that he wouldn't know where he was so that if he was armed, he would not have a shot at him. And we're not challenging that. Those are all reasonable things. That's so said that he observed a bulge in Grace Pants where his hands were and he could not tell whether the bulge was called solely by his hands or by a concealed weapon. That's correct. And that was before he tased him the first time. That was before he tased him the first time. And that's why I said to your honest, we're not going to quibble about the first tasing because before the hands go in, he doesn't see a bulge. He sees a bulge when the hands go in and he says he doesn't know what that is. But the point of the matter is he's not standing. He's not prone at that point after he stays. He's on the ground. He's not moving. And as the officer testified, those pros are still in his chest. And he still has the opportunity by simply pulling that trigger to send another 50,000 votes into this man who has not moved for 23 seconds. And so based upon all of the facts, the totality of the circumstances is what I'm saying. When you look at that, there was nothing objectively reasonable about this. And then when you take into account, we specifically asked the trial court to instruct the jury. For even that part, you are referencing the trial judge's excessive force instruction. Was deficient for the trial. Yeah, instruction 23, which was the only instruction that he gave with respect to the excessive force. It was deficient because, but two things. Number one, it did not adequately set forth the law. And number two, it did not distinguish between the fact that there were two uses of force. Okay, but you're not saying that 23 contained an incorrect statement of law. Are you? I do not. And I think. And being under a plane error standard of review, how do we reach your point when there's nothing incorrect about 23? And you didn't object to it on that? Well, we did object to it. Where did you object to it? What we said was, and I think that we said it for what we said was that 23, in and of itself, was an innocuous instruction. We're not saying that 23 was wrong. What we did was we said that 23 was insufficient. And we tried, we gave the judge three instructions. In fact, that we believe would have cured the deficiency in 23. Where did you say the instruction was deficient? You've got some language on page 10 and 11, and you're breathing. But that, that language is dealing with the immunity. No, you're not on. About immunity. On pages three and four of our reply, we discuss three, four and five of the reply brief. We fully go through exactly why we, how we set forth that instruction 23 was deficient. We set forth the reasons why we believe that our instructions that we had proposed would have cured that problem. And you proposed your instructions on December 19th and the court's jury charge wasn't until January 24th. So how could your instructions have been in response to the court's proposed jury charge when you submitted them a month before that conference even occurred? Well, we submitted them pursuant to the court's order. We submitted the instructions and then we have a charge, a charge conference. And then when the judge presents us with what he proposed to give as instructions. And then we argue to the court. Right. So where's that objection on the record? Do you want to append it to 924? And there we say in this case, we have evidence that an individual was on the ground and not moving and not speaking. And so the issue of a threat comes about and I think it was clear the force used must be clear to your recent objective. And that regard a person who was unable to comply, this would not encompass that individual just the first sentence. So there is where we're talking about why we believe that jury instruction was deficient. And what instruction should have been given in order to at least cure that because clearly? But you were asking for some language that didn't track the facts of the case. Well, you're saying there the following language should be added. It was clearly established at the time of the incident that an individual who poses no threat. And that was the issue whether there was a threat. The fact that he still had his hands in his pants. So to have asked for an instruction that says there is no threat was really taking that issue away from the jury. Well, no, because if the jury concluded that there was no threat, then that instruction would be appropriate. If the jury included, if the jury concluded that there was a threat, then it would not. But we were asking the court because I think that that's the law. If there is no threat, then you don't have the right to use force. Right, but you weren't you weren't couching it in terms of if there on page 924. You asked the court to add to the instruction. It was also clearly established that tasing an individual who. Excuse me, that at the time of the incident, giving rise to this lawsuit that tasing an individual who poses no threat constitutes excessive force. But what we had asked the court to give was it is excessive force for police officer, strike a person who was not resisting, who is not attempting to flee and who does not pose an immediate threat to the safety of the officer or others. That's what we asked the court to get. You're also talking about jury instruction number 30 there. According to page 923, that's the jury instruction you're talking about. Where the language we were asking the court to add that language since he was not. He was not willing to give the instructions that we posed. We were asking him to at least add that language. You're right. So what we were we asked the court to give the instruction that we thought should have been given. Right, but that's not the same as saying that. Number 23. Is incorrect and see when you have a plain error standard here. You've got to show that something that there was a. Substantial and injurious effect on your client due to a failure to properly instruct the jury. I think that. If you give an instruction that is a correct statement of the law, but it does not sufficiently address the issues in the case that would be the same. I think as as Judge Wynn noted in a concurring opinion in no V artson that so long as the charge is accurate on the law and does not confuse or mislead the jury, it is erroneous. The simple this simple inquiry is the heart of our review on an instruction appeal. And so when you look at what Judge Wynn said in no V artson, the point here is that it did mislead the jury. It did mislead them because it did not articulate and set forth before that jury clearly. That we're talking about two separate instances, two uses of force and even if force is justified at the time of the initial use of force, it could not be justified even seconds later if that force. But what you did in this case was really remarkable in the first instance. To get this case beyond the summary judgment and actually before a jury, any plaintiff's lawyers just start salivating if they can do that. So you got it before the jury, but the unfortunate thing is when the jury was presented with this divergent set of facts and everything you say is very reasonable. It very well could have gone that way, but they chose to go the other way. But whatever reason, there have been officers credibility, there have been in a number of things. But what we are now called upon is to look at the law at this. And that's just what happens in a trial like this. I mean, as I said, the trial didn't do this thing pre-trial. In these cases, they never get before the jury because they lost them. Summary judgment or the issues aren't there, the evidence is all one way. You got this thing to the jury. That's powerful thing. The problem is once it gets to the jury there, then you don't know what a jury will come up with. If you're giving them actually two choices. So to prevail here, you now have to say there's nothing here to support that other side. But you do have him with his hands and his pants. And even though he's down on the ground, it's very bad set of facts. The question is, could the jury, for the reasonable jury determined that under these circumstances an officer in this position, the reason believe the threat was still there? I don't believe that a reasonable jury that had been correctly charged could have because you have to and I don't minimize the fact that these cases don't routinely get to juries. I don't minimize that and I agree with the court that this is not the norm. But in this case, the fact that we're there should not be the goal. The fact that we receive a level playing field once we get there is what we're asking for. If we had a level playing field, if we have the law is there, we're not asking you to make new law. We're simply asking this court to apply the law that is there, which is you cannot use force if that threat is eliminated. And if somebody who's on the ground not moving, speechless, motionless doesn't do anything to call into question a threat, then you don't get to use force just to see. And I think the analogy is provided with respect. I don't want to interrupt you, sir, but I just want to make sure you know you're using your rebuttal. I do. And unless there's another question, I'll stop at this point. Okay, sir. Thank you. Ms. Lee. Sandra Lee representing Appellee. Your honours, you've raised a number of relevant questions. The issue in this matter, of course, on the excessive force claim of plaintiff is whether the use of force was reasonable under the circumstances. In order to determine whether the use of force was reasonable, in this case, the use of force according to the second amended complaint and plaintiff's argument were the two uses of the taser. The determination is whether the nature and quality of the intrusion on the, the Seed and the Fourth Amendment interests are weighed against the counter-vailing governmental interests indicate that the use of force was unreasonable. In order to establish that use of force was unreasonable, plaintiff had the burden of showing that plaintiff had the burden of proof. Well, isn't the bottom line of your case this was a jury question? Of course. You're on it. There were disputes of fact throughout the trial. Okay. And Mr. Latimer has, I mean, he makes a very compelling point when he says somebody lying on the ground for 23 seconds. I mean, that's an eternity at five in the morning. So it seems to me that you frame your jury question on the entire scene rather than this 22nd interval, 23 second interval. And, you know, really, I don't know that there's that much more that you're saying other than the fact that it's a jury question is there, except for the the jury instruction? You're on the jury, the issue that has been presented by plaintiff is whether there was sufficient evidence for the jury to render the verdict that it did. And in particular, with regard to the second tasing, Council has argued before this court, as he argued at trial, that the second tasing was not, second use of the tasing was not reasonable because the the scene was on the ground and was not moving. You know, on this, this was a horrible tragic result. So in the indication that there was a threat to the office that was when he first arrived. And you got two individuals currently fighting. He's called because they're fighting. I take it. No one has said anything about a gun. No one. Directed. No weapon or anything of that sort. It is correct that there is no, there was no report of a weapon. What the officer knew when he arrived at the scene was that there were 9-1-1 calls for a fight among two or three males. When he arrived, he observed two males, the decedent Jeffrey Gray, and one of the trial witnesses, Mr. Duval, what he called actively fighting. But no indication that either one of them, you would think you're fighting and you had a gun on you, you probably would bring that gun out, and that would end that fight, or at least it would cause the person you fighting to not do anything. But none of that happened. None of that happened. One might indeed speculate that, I mean, it doesn't all kind of look when you look at it and I'm getting my mind around the whole business of the reasonable officer, but it is a situation that is created by the presence of the officer that he didn't feel so threatened. The officer was responding to a call for service. It was his job to respond to the call for service. When he observed the individuals fighting, it was his job to secure the safety of those individuals and of the people from each other or from the neighbors or from whom. What was he secured? The individuals who have seen to be fighting amongst themselves, and not fighting the neighbors, hadn't heard anybody say they were threatened by it or nobody else had just fighting among the cells. What is he secured? In your example, Your Honor, you pos it that had one of the individuals been carrying a weapon that individual might have pulled it out and used it. Clearly, if an individual, one of the individuals was fighting, was armed, was carrying a weapon and had not yet used it, if the fight was to continue with the officer just standing back and watching or using only the minimal level of force of the verbal commands, which he did use. I'm trying to understand in terms of carrying a weapon and I understand people can carry them up front, but normally it would seem to me that someone who's in a fight, if you got a weapon in your pants, I mean, you think it ought to be in a host or something, I mean it can't just be sitting inside of your pants while you're fighting, but would it? Had you, Your Honor, been on the jury, you might have presented that. But I want to know the evidence in terms of, because there seem to be some indication that it is, you know, people have guns in front of and I mean, we can kind of use common sense. So yeah, you can carry a gun as a good place to put it. But I'm, is it reasonable for a person who's involved in some type of a serious fight to have a gun in front of them the whole time they're fighting and I'm trying to picture this. Now, is he wearing those kind of pants that young guys all wear it as halfway down his whatever there? I don't know. I mean, those are the things that be salient. Facts to me, at least when I'm thinking about it and I'm not saying it's not a jury question, I don't know if it was presented in this light, but it, but all of those things come together when you're thinking about, well, the officer is threatened. And if he's in this kind of a neighborhood or he's been here in this situation, he knows this person could be having a gun. But if, but if the nature of it is an active fight, but he's going after it, I don't know how they're fighting. That's, that doesn't seem to be described. It would be relevant to me how they're fighting. They're pulling on each other and falling on the ground and he's got a gun in front of him. And I mean, I'm trying to figure that one out. It makes sense if you walk up on someone and they're just standing there and he puts his hand down in front of me. He's holding it. But someone who's been fighting, he's going to have a gun. Judge, when that, if I'm, if I might address the, please, but the facts and circumstances before the officer at each of the officer's actions, when he arrived, he observed men fighting that as a crime. As the officer testified, he observed the crimes of disorderly conduct, which while a minor crime does. Why? I'm going to tell him that he has a duty, has a duty to do something. He sees something wrong and he's going to take an action where I'm, when I'm trying to go to is a question of the reasonable threat that arises because he has, it seems to focus on the fact he's got those hands in front of him. And that would indicate a threat because he could have a gun. I mean, if he's got his hands in front of him and nothing there, there's no threat. I mean, you can put your hands in front of you. It's not a threat for you, I wouldn't think, but he's got to have something, or some believe something is there. Your officer, what the jury heard on that subject was that after the officer had arrived and given the commands to throw the hands and get down on the ground, the two of the individuals, one individual complied, that's Mr. Cajiga, two of the individuals cursed him, said they were not doing anything. The officer then deployed, as Taser means, pulled it out as he explained, that deployed a Taser means, and said again, gave the commands lie down and show me your hands, get down on the ground and show me your hands, or you'll be tased. One of the individuals, Mr. Duval, got down on the ground and showed his hands. The other individual, and this was the use, this was the threat that the officer testified he perceived. One of the other individual, Mr. Gray, turned his back on the officer and his hands, that point had been out of his waistband, put his hand into the waistband of his pants. I have not observed the pants, but apparently they were of the variety that had a loose enough waistband that the hands could go into the waistband. It's not in evidence, but the officer has also was not sure that if it was in his pockets, it's not in the record. And he would not take his hands out. And he would not take his hands out. Tell me this, had he taken them out, would that have been a cause to then shoot it, because you don't know what he pulled, who's pulling out? Seems like that's really when the threat occurs. That is not while his hands is in his pants, it's when it comes out of his pants. I respect that. So he's in a loose, loose situation when he turns around, puts his hands in his pants, even if he pulls those, even more so, he pulls that hand out of that pants at that time. That would really seem to be strong evidence. There's a potential threat, because he didn't, he can't see that. Those were not, those were not the circumstances that face the other side. But I'm sure, I'm sure. None of these circumstances, if we accept where this is going, these facts indicate that once he turned around, put his hands, I think of any, because once we write this kind of thing, we're going to have to zero in on that fact that his hands is maybe concealed in a spot. Then that's, there had been front could be in a coat pocket, could be in the side. And you don't know what's in there. And long as it's in there, probably there's not a threat as long as it's there, because he's turned around with it down. The problem occurs if he pulls it out. It would seem that's a threat. But as long as he's turned around with his back turned that way, he's simply disobeying the orders and not, not agreeing, but, but where's the threat? I point out, Your Honor, that, that the taser, when it was, when it was used, struck Mr. Torres in the chest, so he had turned toward the officer before the officer used the taser. For matters of this sort regarding how fast or whether a weapon can be used from within the pants of Your Honor, by his hands out of his pants. He did not. Or at least he was not afraid. As long as his hands were in the pants, and out of him to use a gun, he'd put his hands down there and then take the gun and pull it up in his pants. A threat would happen when he would take it out. Judge Win, I respectfully disagree that there was no threat until he removed his hands from the pants. Besides which, first, well, first, the expert testimony in this case was defense expert Thomas was a use of force expert qualified as an expert who testified that when a person puts his hands in his pants, it is a threat. It constitutes a threat. And what makes it a threat? Because he may use a weapon. He may have his hands. Inside his pants. Absolutely. While his hands are down inside his pants. Absolutely. If, if, and that's a common occurrence, someone puts their hands down in, do not pull them out, but they shoot through their pants. I guess is what you're saying. Your Honor, the question is not whether it is a common occurrence. The question is, those questions are the questions. The question is whether or not there's a threat. Whether it poses a threat. Yes. And the expert testimony, which the jury was entitled to believe, was that the putting of the placement of the hands in pants, the officer had been taught in and of itself is a threat. Well, let me move to the next. No, I want to understand that fact. I want to understand this fact of the hands in the pants. Because I don't know where they go. I understand the total, the circumstance was going on, but it was zero in that the threat here is the hands in the pants. And your expert says the mere fact. Is that what he's saying? The mere fact hands in pants is a threat. Nothing more. Yes. Your Honor, have you read testimony from police officers who testify about how fast a weapon can be used? It is a matter of a second or less for a hand to come out of the pants with a hand on the trigger. Are you quoting the record now or is this you? This is not in this. This is not in this. Why don't you stick to the record then? Well, certainly well, Judge Kenan. Does it matter whether or not he has a taser or whether he has a gun the officer? Would he have been just equally justified to a shot him with a gun? Under these circumstances. First, of course, I must say he did not do so. Oh, I understand that. But if we write it in this way and because the standard is reasonable officer and it seems that it's not the level of force, it's the threat that he's having at time. So it does not, does it matter? If he'd put out his gun and had it on him and shot him for having his hands in his pants. Now if we're taking him out, just having his hands in his pants. And you say an expert said that's enough. That is a threat of, according to the testimony that the jury heard, that was a, the officer was presented with a threat of deadly physical force. So you're saying serious, just by shooting him. And under the law, a threat of serious physical injury or deadly force or death. Does justify the use of deadly force. Deadly force was not used in this case. The officer had no reason to believe that the force that he was using would culminate in the tragic death of Mr. Gray. Moreover, I point out that there was evidence that there was no causal connection between the use of the taser and the death of Mr. Gray and that the jury found as a matter of fact that the officer's acts did not cause the death of Mr. Gray. We may or may not agree with the jury, but that was the jury's finding of fact. And it was supported by the medical examiner's testimony, expert testimony, which is required for matters like this that are beyond the can of the average lay juror, that there was a temporal connection, which is merely repeating the obvious that obviously the man died after he had had the taser used against him, but that there was not any evidence of a causal connection between the use of the taser and Mr. Gray's tragic death. Your Honor, the... How hard are they saying he died? I think if I can... What was the reason why he died? What was the evidence that... Health, hole intoxication and restraint. Oh, wait a minute, there was something else. Then the tasering... They're saying there was nothing about the fact that the lodging of one of the probes near his heart caused cardiac arrhythmia, nothing at all in this record. There is nothing in the medical examiner's testimony, expert testimony. He was the only medical expert who was the testified at trial that supports a conclusion that the tasering, the use of the taser near the heart resulted in caused the death of Mr. Gray. Other cases in other matters, there has been... The official calls of death was listed as undetermined. Is that right? Yes, Your Honor. Yes, but that is correct. So that's different. I don't know where we go where you... That last part you're just going to... I find it hard to believe it's not ACALs. I'm not saying Z-CALs, but it could be ACALs and that's really all you need is a connective in terms of proximate cause of it. But the question here deals with this excessive force and there is some indication that the appellant didn't object yet, the Augustriniolously, he objected to this instruction and points to the record these points and how do you respond to that? In the Fox, what kind of review should be here? If you read the... As we argued in our brief, Your Honor, if you read the charging conference, there was no objection made to instruction 23, which was the excessive force. Instruction, nor was there any request that it be supplemented at that time. And was that actually instruction 24 during the... It was, yes, Your Honor, because during instruction 8, I believe, regarded inner agitories, and there had not been any inner agitories presented. So there was during instruction, proposed during instruction 8 was removed. Thus, the discussion that Council referred to during instruction, regarded during instruction 30, which was the qualified immunity instruction, I'm sorry, proposed instruction 30, which turned out to be instruction 29, which was given to the jury. The issue with regard to the qualified immunity, of course, was whether it was clearly established that the use of force was unconstitutional. Your Honor, the jury's verdict was not irreconcilably inconsistent in this case. The jury found that there was a use of force, the tasering, that it was objectively reasonable. The jury was instructed properly in jury instruction 23, that the standard was whether a reasonable officer could have believed that the use of force was necessary because of the Graham standards of whether a crime had been committed and how serious the crime was, in this case, Judge Wynn has pointed out that the only crime was a assault with hands and no use of weapon, nonetheless, there was a crime, and whether there was a threat, the officer's testimony, along with the testimony of the defendant's expert, Mr. Thomas, was accepted by the jury that there was a threat, that the officer's use of force and assault of Mr. Gray was a privileged use of force, that he was entitled to the defense of defending himself or others. The jury's verdict was actually completely consistent in that it found a use of force and found that the use of force was privileged with regard to the state cranks claims and reasonable with regard to the federal 1983 claim. Your Honor, the case cited by both parties, Noel V. Artsen, I believe, is dispositive as to the issue whether the jury was required to receive instructions marshalling the evidence and commenting on the evidence. It was not, it was properly instructed, the discretion of the district court was properly exercised and I- Did the deputy call the EMS in between the TAsian? Yes, Your Honor. In the 23 seconds between the- It is standard operating procedure, police procedure, in every jurisdiction in which I've practiced that the use of a taser or the other use of force, but specifically the use of a taser, is grounds to call for medical response. So what happened in the 23- God bless or what happens once you- Absolutely. Actually, actually use it you then call the EMS. Yes, and- Because a taser can be a lethal weapon. No, Your Honor, I respectfully submit that that is not the reason that the EMS is called. It is clearly a disruptive use of force on an individual and individual as this court may have encountered in other cases an individual. Falls may hurt himself, so in that 23 seconds between the beginning of the first tasering, first five seconds went on during which the first taser was used. So they all were down to what's 23- My 18 seconds- When he fell, did he fall, he fell first face- He fell on- He fell on- On the front, on the front, on the back. And he down facing at that time the ground- Yes, Your Honor, and his hands are still down inside of his pants. Your Honor, the officer was not able to testify, stated that his hands were beneath him Because his elbows were up, it might be reasonable to conclude that his hands had left his waist- But he's not moving. He hasn't made it- You know, we talked about this business that he wasn't pulling the hands out while he was standing, but now he's down on the ground and there is a threat that he's going to be able to pull out face down to the ground, a gun turned around and shoot him. Your Honor, you would not have to turn around. He had fallen to the ground, his hands were beneath him. Had- had- It was not there- The officer could not tell whether his hands were still in his waistband, where, by the way, he'd also seen a bulge which he did not know was whether it was a weapon or not. And if his- If he was holding a weapon, he certainly could have fired at the officer. And the officer's response of moving from where he had originally been and calling EMS were both responses that he was trained to do after the use of a taser- Did he move to the side or move behind it? He moved to the side, he moved in and in part so that he would not be in the same location relative to Mr. Gray. Respectfully, Your Honor, that is completely consistent with the officer's testified subjective concern that the weapon would be used against him. Thank you, Your Honor. Thank you, Miss Lee. Mr. Lightimer. I think just based upon what they've just said, that there could not have been a threat to this officer, as Judge Wynn has talked about, his hands, according to the officer, are in his pants. There's no threat then. The expert didn't testify that the threat arises when your hands go into your waistband, what the expert testified was that a weapon- If there is anything about the jury instructions in this case that would have prevented you from arguing to the jury what you're arguing to us now. We were not- I mean in all candid, we were not prevented by the trial court in our arguments. The trial court did not- Did you argue that? Did you argue that to the jury? That's what we just discussed. And in other words, the threat does not arise from being hands- but it arises by the possibility or the chance that he could be pulling out a gun and using it. Was that the nature of your argument? That there was no threat because his hands actually stayed in his pants the whole time. And more so when he fell down first, a face forward on the ground, that threat, if it had existed standing up, had to be diminished because he was down on the ground this time. Did you argue that? I believe we did. I believe we did. And the other side argued differently. So that there end is where just that is going is that's a jury question. If the jury chooses not to believe one or the other, we are caught a blow here. So what makes us be able to pick and choose which facts we think are more reasonable? Well, I don't think that I'm asking- And I must say it does sound quite reasonable. That it is hard to believe there's a threat. It's obvious but it's not beyond the province of evidence that a jury could come to that conclusion, is it? Well, I do. I do. It is because you cannot just say that something is a threat because somebody says it's a threat. There has to be some objective reason for this. And what we're saying is no reasonable jury could have- No reasonable jury that had been properly charged could have concluded that was a threat. What is the threat? We have asked this question repeatedly in our papers. We have put the gauntlet to them to tell this court what is the threat? The only threat that the officer says was that he didn't move his hand. But the threat is not in your pants. The threat is what you bring out your pants. You don't- The officer had moved. He testified. He had moved. Therefore, the officer who was standing in front of him and tased him was no longer standing in front of him and tased him. So this guy would have had to pull a weapon, turn, find the officer, and then use this weapon supposedly that he has. While he has two pens in him that are capable of sending 50,000 votes and officers holding a trigger to that, officers are arriving on the scene. The officer had no need to take immediate action. There was no threat. And we go back to the jury. I mean, I think that the trial judge had it right the first time when he said that the jury's decision wasn't really a decision at all. I mean, we've got a verdict for him that comes back. You're supposed to reach a unanimous verdict and everybody and every question has written into it a consensus. And that was the jury called? The jury was called and they said that was our verdict. Yes, we reached a consensus. Or what does consensus mean? They argue that well, Webster's dictionary says that a consensus is a synonym of unanimous. However, the jury wasn't told that. The jury wasn't given a dictionary. The jury was told. Did you ask the court for further clarification of that? The court told us it was declaring a mistrial. We did not have an opportunity. We assumed that when the court told us it was going to declare a mistrial because the jury's verdict did not, they had not reached a verdict that that was what was going to happen. We were shot. We were totally shot when the judge accepted that verdict and excused the jury. The judge had told us prior to bringing that jury in to have them read that verdict that he was going to declare a mistrial. So we don't get the opportunity to do that. So when you talk about the jury's verdict, I mean, that is a major issue here. What is a consensus? The jury wasn't told what a consensus was. The jury did, yes, we all expect the jury's following instructions that they are given. That is what we're taught from day one. You're a litigator. That is what you believe. But when a jury comes back and every question has written consensus, consensus, we could not reach a consensus. How then does that mean that they have followed the instruction? It doesn't. They didn't. And when you say it's not irreconcilable, the jury indicated in this case there was an assault and battery, but then there was no excessive force. That's not consistent. That cannot be harmonized. No way can that be harmonized. And when you have all of these things which come into account. Okay, Mr. Liedmer. I hate to interrupt you again, but that's the red light. That's right. Could you please just take one minute and wrap it up? I do. And I submit to you that there was no threat for the officer to, the significant threat that justified the officer using force after the first tasing. We submit to you that the jury instructions did not adequately set forth the law. And we submit to you that this verdict based upon what the jury said was a consensus was irreconcilably irreconcilable with what they issued. And for that reason, the trial court aired when it did not grant a new trial. And so we would ask that a new trial be granted in this case. Thank you, Your Honor. Thank you. Court will come down to greet Council and then we'll proceed to your next case